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can achieve theseregulatory
Further,hybridization
jurisdictionality.
rewardswhilesimultaneously
, formaldistinction
retaininga healthy
betweenjurisdictionalityand nonjurisdictionality.
The result is a
cleaner,truer,and moreusefulconceptualization
jurisdiction.
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Introduction
As every first-yearU.S. law student learns, federal subject-matter
jurisdictionis somethingseparate,special, and unique. Nowhereis thatlesson
driven home more forcefullythan in the ancient but oft-assignedcase of
Capron v. VanNoorden} There,a plaintiff
broughta diversityactionin federal
1. 6 U.S.(2Cranch)
126(1804).

This content downloaded from 130.65.109.20 on Sat, 20 Jun 2015 17:17:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

2011]

HYBRIDIZINGJURISDICTION

144 1

courtand lost at trialon themerits.The plaintiff
thenappealed,citinghis own
failureto allege diversityof citizenshipproperly.The SupremeCourt agreed
and vacated the judgmentagainst the plaintifffor lack of jurisdiction,even
who invokedthatjurisdictionin thefirstplace.2
thoughitwas theplaintiff
Capron suggests that federal subject-matter
jurisdictionis differentin
it is
kind fromotherrequirementsof substanceand procedure.Jurisdiction,
said, is the "power" of the court.3As such, and generallyunlike mattersof
procedureor substance,jurisdictioncarrieswithit a standardset of effects:It
cannotbe consentedto; jurisdictionaldefectscannotbe waived, forfeited,
or
excused forequitablereasons,and theymay be raised by any partyany time
beforefinaljudgment;judgmentsenteredwithoutjurisdictionare void; and the
courthas an obligationto assureitselfof itsownjurisdictionat all times.4
By most accounts, these are uniformlyheld, well-established,and
uncontroversial
reiteratetheseprinciples
principles.Courtsand commentators
with a certitudethat shuns hesitationor question.5 Their repetitionhas
entrenched
the idea ofjurisdictionas a rigidantipodeto nonjurisdictional
law,
such as procedural rules and substantiveelements. A court either has
jurisdictionor does not, and, when it does not, thereis nothingto do but
dismissthecase.6
I aim to shakethingsup a bit.In previouswork,I have attempted
to refute
and nonjurisdictionality
the rigiddichotomyof jurisdictionality
by explaining
thata nonjurisdictional
rule can have any- or even all- of the attributesof
Such hybridizednonjurisdictionalrules have their own
jurisdictionality.7
rules and
nonjurisdictional
salutaryrole to play in legal regimesby permitting
doctrinesto have a broad range of effectsthatbetterimplementthe rules'
which could be
normsand goals. One example is state sovereignimmunity,
rulethatthedefendantcan waive but
cast as a mandatory
butnonjurisdictional
that,like a jurisdictionalrule,thecourthas no discretionto refuseto applyonce
properlyinvoked.8
That nonjurisdictional
rules can have jurisdictionaleffectscauses these
ofjurisdictionality
two categoriesto collide and erodestheantipodaldefinition
as altogetherdifferent
fromnonjurisdictionality.
Hybridizingnonjurisdictionalitywithjurisdictionaleffectsundermines
separatesphereof
jurisdictionality's
maybe subjectto a
uniquenessand raisesthequestionwhetherjurisdictionality
similarhybridization.
2. Id.at126-27.
3. Seeinfra
note18.
456U.S.694,702(1982)(setting
4. SeeIns.Corp.
ofIr.v.Compagnie
desBauxites
deGuinee,
outcharacteristics
ofsubject-matter
jurisdiction).
18-24.
5. Seeinfra
notes
6. SeeExparte
74U.S.(7 Wall.)506,514(1868).
McCardle,
7. SeeScott
Rules
L.REV.1(2008).
Dodson,
, 61STAN.
Mandatory
I propose
a counter8. See id.at 15-33.I amnotwedded
tothischaracterization.
Indeed,
inPart
IIIofthis
Article.
characterization
ofstate
immunity
sovereign
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This Articleoffersan answer:jurisdictionalrules can have featuresof
too. Hybridizationoffersmore accurateways of concepnonjurisdictionality,
that
are otherwisedifficultto place in the jurisdictionaltualizingdoctrines
nonjurisdictionaldichotomy. Further,by circumscribingjurisdiction and
more judicial and partycontrol,hybridizationcan reduce the
incorporating
costliness of jurisdiction.Finally, hybridizationcan achieve all this while
retaining a healthy, formal distinction between jurisdictionalityand
nonjurisdictionality.9
A closer look at Capron gives a preview of how jurisdictioncan be
of citizenshipactuallyexistedin Capron
Note thatwhetherdiversity
hybridized.
was unclear.The problemwas thatthe plaintifffailed to allege diversityof
of
and therecordin thelowercourtshowedno evidenceof diversity
citizenship,
of citizenshipdid notinfact
But none of thatmeansthatdiversity
citizenship.10
exist.For all the SupremeCourtknew,thetwo partiesmightactuallyhave had
diversecitizenships,
givingthelowercourtproperjurisdiction.
Thatpossibilitywas of littleconcernbecause theSupremeCourtreliedon
- indeed, was irrelevantto- the question of
a rule that was different
from
whetherdiversityof citizenshipactuallyexisted.Instead,the Court's rule was
that federaltrial courts lack jurisdiction"unless the record shews that the
to
states."11That rulerelegatesjurisdictionality
partiesare citizensof different
elementsof a claim.
a questionofproofnotunlikethatrequiredforsubstantive
Perhaps it makes sense thatthe actual presence of diverse partiesis a
jurisdictionalrequirement.But that does not mean that the test for, and
mechanisms of, proving diversity of citizenship are also jurisdictional
One might,instead,considerwhethersuch testsand mechanisms
requirements.
should be amenable to typical nonjurisdictionalfeatures,such as equitable
Those nonjurisdictional
featuresmightthen
estoppel,waiver, and forfeiture.
affecttheultimatejurisdictionaldetermination.
Divorcing the core question of federaljurisdictionfromits nonjurisdictionalmode of proof may seem strangetoday, but, historically,a party
waived its objectionto the lack of jurisdictionin federalcourtby failingto
followproperprocedure.In Capron's time,a defendantwaived any objections
to subject-matter
jurisdictionby filing an answer instead of a plea in
Parties could concoct federaljurisdictionby pleading and not
abatement.12
canbeblended,
andnonjurisdictionality
thesis
isthat
9. Because
mybroader
jurisdictionality
witha meaning
linked
totheir
inmyattempt
tocontinue
tousetheseterms
there
is someirony
fornowis
I willhavemore
that
intheConclusion,
butmyexcuse
tosayabout
traditional
definitions.
I
with
monikers.
various
todifferentiate
that
thelexicon
is notyetbigenough
single
hybridizations
be understandable
tojudicialdiscretion"
like"jurisdictional
might
yetsubject
hopethatphrases
enough.
126,126( 1804).
v.VanNoorden,
6 U.S.(2 Cranch)
10. Capron
11. Id.
12. SeeMichael
G. Collins,
Jurisdictional
, 93 VA.L. REV.1829,1839-40
Exceptionalism
(2007).
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even if the parties' allegations
objectingto the jurisdictionalrequirements,
contradictedfactualreality.13Parties could admitjurisdictionalfacts.14As a
result,manycases were litigatedand decided by federalcourtsthatotherwise
lackedjurisdictionto do so.15
now,16but,as I will argue,theyare farless different
Thingsare different
thanconventionally
thought.Even today,federallaw oftenlinksjurisdictionto
nonjurisdictionalprocedures. Some jurisdictional doctrines and statutes
or expressly.Nonjurisdictional
featuresinherently
incorporate
nonjurisdictional
of
timingrules can controlthe temporalscope jurisdictionaldecision making.
Rules
Jurisdictional
preconditions.
questionscan dependupon nonjurisdictional
In each of these cases,
of proof can regulatejurisdictionalfact-finding.
rules or features.The
jurisdictionalrules are hybridizedwithnonjurisdictional
resultis a farmorecomplexworldthanwhatthe oversimplified
dichotomyof
and
suggests.
jurisdictionality nonjurisdictionality
Hybridization,then,offersa cleaner and more accurate pictureof the
Doctrinessuch
and nonjurisdictionality.
relationshipbetweenjurisdictionality
as personal jurisdiction,sovereign immunity,mootness, and discretionary
into eitherone exclusively;
declinationof jurisdictiondo not fitcomfortably
and nonjurisdictionality.
rather,theyall have featuresof bothjurisdictionality
relationship,
By reconceptualizingthe jurisdictionality-nonjurisdictionality
more
how
these
doctrines
function.
accuratelyexplains
hybridization
with nonHybridizationbegets regulation.Hybridizingjurisdictionality
in
to
confine
determinations
can,
effect,
specified
jurisdictional
jurisdictionality
circumstancesand conditions.In some cases, the federalcourtsmay regulate
jurisdictionthroughthe exercise of judicial discretionor considerationof
equitable circumstances.In othercases, the partiesmay regulatejurisdiction
of waiver,consent,or forfeiture.
throughconsiderations

tohavetheir
as discussed
theparties
couldevencollude
13. Id.at1838-39
below,
("Indeed,
courtwitha combination
of a plaintiff's
casetriedin federal
pleaanda
proper
jurisdictional
ofthesystem
to
defendant's
id.at 1877("The[common
law]encouraged
gaming
non-objection.");
- really
- under
. . . Theresult
when
itdidnot
somealternative
setofproofs
exist.
secure
jurisdiction
itbecame
courts
continued
tohearcasesevenwhen
clearthat
wasthat
federal
mayhave
jurisdiction
beenlacking
infact,
orevenconcocted.").
theIssueofSubjectMatter
Jurisdiction
14. SeeDanB.Dobbs,
Beyond
Bootstrap:
Foreclosing
FinalJudgment
L.Rev.491,511(1967).
, 51MINN.
Before
with
15. SeeCollins,
onthepleadings,
when
("Emphasis
coupled
supranote12,at 1832-33
withitthe
thenarrowly
carried
limited
to go behind
construed
record,
procedural
opportunities
- thatcasesoutside
- often
III or Congress's
statutes
realized
ofArticle
implementing
possibility
theparty
Ata minimum,
as Capron
itself
would
beheard
however,
courts.").
bythefederal
suggests,
invoke
it.
federal
would
havetoproperly
seeking
jurisdiction
of
16. Compare
v. Cotton,
535U.S.625,630(2002)("[An]elastic
United
States
concept
orconstitutional
isnotwhat
theterm
means
today,
e.g.,thecourts'
statutory
jurisdiction
'jurisdiction'
notes
marks
with
text
toadjudicate
thecase.")(internal
omitted),
infra
accompanying
power
quotation
70-81(describing
themore
elastic
historical
concept).
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Jurisdictional
is antitheticalto the modernconceptionof
regulatability
as
of partyor courtcontrol.But thatconception
jurisdiction largelyindependent
is theoretically
and descriptivelywrong.And jurisdictionalregulatability
has
the potential to be normativelydesirable. Increased court control may
reestablishthe power to impose considerationsof fairnessontojurisdictional
issues. Increasedpartycontrolmay alleviatesome of the costs of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction
can, and perhapsshould,be regulablethroughhybridization.
At the same time,I am not yet preparedto banishjurisdictionentirely.
Jurisdiction
can play important
structural,
expressive,and psychologicalroles.
also helps
Hybridization,
by focusingratherthaneliminating
jurisdictionality,
to reaffirmit. Hybridization,perhaps paradoxically, both connects and
and nonjurisdictionality,
and, in the process, it
distinguishes
jurisdictionality
bothsoftensand strengthens
jurisdiction.
This Articleexploresthe complex and understudied
world of hybridized
Part
I
situates
thesis
in
the
broader
literature
of jurisdictionjurisdiction.
my
rulesmaybe hybridizedwithjurisdictionality.It shows how nonjurisdictional
al featuresand theorizeshowjurisdictionalrulesmightbe hybridizedsimilarly.
PartII tellsa descriptivestoryof hybridized
jurisdictionalrulesas neithernew
nor controversialnor particularlyuncommon and develops an original
taxonomy to categorize and illustratethe various types of hybridized
jurisdictionalrules in federalcourts. PartIII then analyzes the prescriptive
doctrinesin a more
utilityof the taxonomyin helpingto classifyill-fitting
accurate,hybridizedway. Finally, Part IV offersa normativeaccount of
hybridized
jurisdictionalrulesby focusingon thebeneficialregulatory
powerto
whichhybridization
can subjectjurisdictionaldoctrine.I conclude withsome
brief observationsof the implicationsof my insightsto the literatureand
current
federaldoctrine.
I.
Jurisdictionality and Nonjurisdictionality
This Part introducesjurisdictionaltheoryand situatesmy thesis in the
broaderliterature
ofjurisdictionality.
It shows how nonjurisdictional
rulesmay
be hybridizedwithjurisdictionaleffectsand theorizeshow jurisdictionalrules
mightbe hybridizedsimilarly.
A. TraditionalConceptualization
: A RigidDichotomy
The usual conceptualization
ofjurisdictionality
and nonjurisdictionality
is
- they are
that of separate spheres and mutuallyopposing characteristics
antithesesof each other.As one commentator
has put it,"[i]n modernAnglo-
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American legal doctrine,legal issues are either 'jurisdictional' or 'nonjurisdictional.'"17
Jurisdiction
is typicallydefinedas the"power"18or basic "authority"19
of
a federalcourt.It protectsnonlitigant
values
of
federalism,separation
systemic
of powers, and judicial-resourceallocation,20which cannot be safeguarded
adequately by the parties or the court. Thus, jurisdiction typically is
characterizedby a rigidset of effectsthatplace it beyondthe controlof the
parties:A jurisdictionalrule can be raised at any time,includingforthe first
timeon appeal; it obligatesthecourtto police compliancesua sponte;and it is
not subject to principlesof equity,waiver, forfeiture,
consent,or estoppel.21
Jurisdiction
is "inflexible"and "withoutexception."22
Withoutit,a court'sonly
option is to dismiss.23As one commentatorhas stated,"[s]o sanctifiedis
surroundsit."24
[jurisdiction's]formulathata halo of constitutionality
is
concerned
with
mattersof substance
By contrast,nonjurisdictionality
and procedureand can be subjectto partyand courtcontrol.Such controlhas
value. The partiescan choose which rules are worthlitigatingand which are
not, therebyconservingresourcesfor more importantissues. The court can
injectfairnessand equityif individualizedcircumstancescall forthem.As a
rules usually are definedas having all the inverse
result,nonjurisdictional
- theycan be waived, forfeited,
effectsofjurisdictionality
or consentedto, and
are
to
and
they subject equitableexceptions,estoppel, judicial discretion.25

17. Perry
andtheLegalImagination
L. REV.1,4
Time,
Dane,Jurisdictionality,
, 23HOFSTRA
of"quasi-jurisdictional"
or"almost
(1994).Butcf.id.at4 n.4(acknowledging
examples
jurisdictional"
John
R. Sand& Gravel
Co.v. United
552U.S. 130,135(2008)(characterizing
the
States,
issues);
intheTucker
statute
oflimitations
Actasa "more
absolute"
bar).
18. See Cotton
as "thecourts'
or
, 535 U.S. at 630 (characterizing
jurisdiction
statutory
constitutional
thecase");McDonald
v. Mabee,243 U.S. 90, 91 (1915)
powerto adjudicate
as "power");
Ex parteMcCardle,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.)506,514(1868)
(characterizing
jurisdiction
ispower
todeclare
thelaw. . . .");Lawrence
GeneSager,
Constitutional
Limitations
on
("Jurisdiction
toRegulate
theJurisdiction
L. Rev.17,22
, 95 HARV.
Congress'
Authority
oftheFederalCourts
ofsubject-matter
inourlegalsystem
refers
tothemotive
force
ofa
(1981)("Theconcept
jurisdiction
theroot
toadjudicate
a specified
setofcontroversies.").
court,
power
19. SeeKontrick
v. Ryan,
540U.S.443,455(2004)(referring
tojurisdiction
as "a court's
EvanTsenLee,TheDubiousConcept
L.J.
, 54 HASTINGS
adjudicatory
authority");
ofJurisdiction
a definition
of"power"
andinstead
as a facet
1613,1617(2003)(rejecting
characterizing
jurisdiction
of"authority").
20. SeeScott
InSearch
Jurisdiction
Dodson,
, 102Nw.U.L. REV.55,59(2008)
ofRemoval
embodies
societal
suchas federalism,
ofpowers,
anda
("As'power,'
values,
jurisdiction
separation
limited
national
government.").
21. SeeDodson,
note7,at4-5.
supra
22. Ruhrgas
AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,577 (1999);see also Mansfield,
Coldwater
& LakeMich.
Ry.Co.v.Swan,111U.S.379,382(1884)(same).
23. SeeMcCardle
v. Cooper,
73 U.S.(6 Wall.)247,250
, 74 U.S.(7 Wall.)at514;Mayor
werenojurisdiction,
then
there
wasnopower
todoanything
buttostrike
thecase
(1867)("Ifthere
from
thedocket.").
24. DanB. Dobbs,
TheDecline
,40N.C.L.REV.49,49( 1961).
ofJurisdiction
byConsent
25. SeeDodson,
note7,at5.
supra
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Courts and commentatorsoften make this dichotomy between
and nonjurisdictionality
quiterigidand explicit,suggestingthat
jurisdictionality
are mutual opposites in both their
and nonjurisdictionality
jurisdictionality
formal natures and their functional effects.26The distinctionbetween
as Perry Dane has writtenin the
and nonjurisdictionality,
jurisdictionality
rests
on
an
time
contextof
limits,"always
explicitcontrast.... [I]f [a rule] is
thecourtwill read it or treatit one way; if it is notjurisdictional,
jurisdictional,
thecourtwill readitor treatitanotherway."27
Indeed,thecontrastis so starkthata courtoftenwill invokethemantraof
and implythata definedset of effectsinexorablyflows from
jurisdictionality
withoutfurther
thejurisdictionalcharacterization
analysis.For example,in Day
defense. . .
v. McDonough, theSupremeCourtstated,"[a] statuteof limitations
is not 'jurisdictional,'hencecourtsare underno obligationto raise thetimebar
sua sponte."28The Court's assumptionwas that a certain defined set of
nonjurisdictionalattributesnecessarily follows from the nonjurisdictional
of
characterization.The converse assumptionsflow from characterizations
This logic is rampantamongcourtsand commentators.30
jurisdictionality.29
the
most poignantrecent illustrationof the jurisdictionalityPerhaps
dichotomyin action is the 2007 SupremeCourt case of
nonjurisdictionality
Bowles v. Russell. There, Keith Bowles, convictedof murderin state court,
petitionedfora federalwritof habeas corpus,whichthedistrictcourtdenied.31
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107, Bowles had thirtydays to appeal to the courtof
appeals.32Bowles failed to meet thatdeadline and, afterit passed, asked the

areexceptional
26. See,e.g.,Collins,
[in
questions
supranote12,at 1831("[J]urisdictional
thatwouldbe
ofmany
andescapetheapplication
their
andeffects]
ordinary
principles
ordering
ofnonjurisdictional
totheresolution
questions.").
applicable
note17,at12.
27. Dane,supra
seealsoid.at213
547U.S. 198,205(2006)(emphasis
28. Dayv. McDonough,
omitted);
such
oftime-limitation
that
theenactment
stated
J.,dissenting)
periods
(Scalia,
("Wehaverepeatedly
andthus
that
arenonjurisdictional
defenses
in§ 2244(d),
without
further
asthat
elaboration,
produces
andforfeiture.").
towaiver
subject
246F. App'x990,994(6thCir.2007)("[Jurisdictional
29. See,e.g.,Cookv.United
States,
time
limits
cannot
bewaived.").
their
aremandatory;
rules
therefore,
v. Lee,242F. App'x209,210(5thCir.2007)(percuriam)
States
30. See,e.g.,United
time
isthat
these
Thespecific
arenotjurisdictional.
limits
notimposed
implication
("[T]ime
bystatute
rules
are
Cook
limits
, 246F.App'xat994("[C]laim-processing
omitted);
(citations
maybewaived.")
- thus,
E.
canbewaived.")
timelimits
their
notjurisdictional
(citation
omitted);
omitted)
(emphasis
160Years
andEberhart:
intheWake
Deadlines
Jurisdictional
of
Harmonizing
o/Kontrick
KingPoor,
of thedistinction
L. REV.181,207 n.172(2007)("Theimportance
Precedent
, 40 CREIGHTON
deadlines
wasthat
andnonjurisdictional
non-jurisdictional
characterizations]
[between
jurisdictional
andequitable
as 'waiver,
described
toequitable
aresubject
tolling.'")
(quoting
estoppel,
exceptions,
Inc.455U.S.385,393(1982)).
World
Airlines,
Zipesv.Trans
551U.S.205,207(2007).
31. Bowles
v.Russell,
32. 28U.S.C.§2 107(a)(2006).
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districtcourtto reopenthedeadlineto appeal,33as § 2107 allowed himto do.34
The districtcourtgrantedBowles's motionon February10, 2004.35
In its order,the districtcourtspecificallygave Bowles untilFebruary27,
no one objectedto the district
2004, to file his noticeof appeal.36Apparently,
court's order. Following the order, Bowles filed his notice of appeal on
February26, sixteendays afterhis motionhad been grantedand withinthetime
allowed by thedistrict
court'sorder.37
28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) limits
Unfortunately,
time
to
fourteen
Bowles's
notice of appealreopened
periods
days.38Thus,
court'sorder was untimely
underthestatute.
thoughtimelyunderthedistrict
The stateimmediately
movedto dismissBowles's appeal as untimely,
and
the courtof appeals grantedthe state's motion.The SupremeCourtaffirmed,
holding § 2107(c) to be a jurisdictional rule.39 Because the rule was
jurisdictional,the Courtexplained,it barredthe appeal even if the defectwas
inducedby the districtcourt'smisleadingorder,and despiteany unfairnessor
inequityto Bowles.40
41
Thereis muchto criticizeaboutBowles, butformypurposes,it helps to
illustratethe rigid division betweenjurisdictionality
and nonjurisdictionality.
Once the Court held the rule to be jurisdictional,it assumed that the
circumstances
jurisdictionaleffectsautomatically
applied,and theunderlying
- became irrelevant.The Courtofferedno analysis
no matterhow compelling
of why; rather,it merely assumed the truthof its major premise: all
jurisdictionalrulesare immunefromequitableexceptions.
The fourjustices in dissentadheredto the otherside of the dichotomy.
42
They would have characterizedthe rule as nonjurisdictional From that
conclusion,accordingto the dissent,it automaticallyfollowedthatBowles's
43
equitable excuse was viable There was some precedentjustifyingthis

33. Bowles,
551U.S.at207.
34. 28U.S.C.§ 2107(c).
35. Bowles,
551U.S.at207.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 28U.S.C.§ 2107(c).
39. Bowles
wemake
clearthat
thetimely
ofa notice
ofappeal
, 551U.S.at214("Today
filing
ina civilcaseisajurisdictional
requirement.").
40. Id.at213("Andbecause
Bowies'error
isoneofjurisdictional
hecannot
magnitude,
rely
onforfeiture
orwaiver
toexcuse
hislackofcompliance
with
thestatute's
time
id.at214
limitations.");
thisCourt
hasnoauthority
tocreate
tojurisdictional
use
("Because
equitable
exceptions
requirements,
ofthe'unique
circumstances'
doctrine
isillegitimate.").
41. Forsomeofthat
seeScott
TheFailure
v.Russell,
43TULSA
criticism,
Dodson,
o/Bowles
L. REV.631(2008),andScott
andBowlesv.Russell,
102Nw.U.L. REV.
Dodson,
Jurisdictionality
42(2007),
COLLOQUY
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/21/.
42. Bowles
, 551U.S.at216-18 (Souter,
J.,dissenting).
43. Id.at216("While
a mandatory
butnonjurisdictional
limit
attheinsistence
isenforceable
ofa party
itsbenefit
orbya judgeconcerned
with
thedocket,
itmaybewaived
or
claiming
moving
inexercising
reasonable
discretion.").
mitigated
equitable
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but the thrustof the dissenters'argumentwas primarily
based on a
position,44
that
was
the
of
all
the
major premise
antipode
majority's: nonjurisdictional
rulesare (at leastpresumptively)
subjectto equitableexceptions.
Bowles thusillustrates
thecustomaryconceptualization
ofjurisdictionality
and nonjurisdictionality
as occupying mutuallyexclusive doctrinalspace.
if a rule is jurisdictional,it falls intoone
Accordingto thatconceptualization,
it falls intoa
basketwithone definedset of effects;if it is nonjurisdictional,
45
different
basketwitha definedset of inverseeffects
B. ExpandingDefinitions:HybridizedNonjurisdictional
Rules
As I have arguedelsewhere,thisrigiddichotomyis false,at least fromthe
rules.46In contrastto theconventionalwisdom,
perspectiveof nonjurisdictional
inherent
in
the
nature
of
nothing
nonjurisdictionality
preventsnonjurisdictional
rules fromhavingjurisdictionaleffects.47
rules
Indeed,some nonjurisdictional
exhibit
certain
rules
of
attributes.
For
currently
example,
jurisdictional
not
be
to
are
bankruptcy
procedure nonjurisdictional
susceptible party
yetmay
Rules 33 and 45(b) of the Federal Rules of
consent,waiver, or forfeiture.48
CriminalProcedure,which provide a rigid deadline of seven days to file a
motion for a new trial, are nonjurisdictional,
yet a court may not excuse
49
In a federalhabeas case, a
with
them
for
reasons
noncompliance
equitable
defense
statecannotforfeit
or be estoppedfromassertingthenonjurisdictional
the"unique
44. SeeThompson
v. INS,375U.S.384,387(1964)(percuriam)
(reaffirming
Truck
Inc.v. Cherry
overruled
circumstances"
Lines,
, 551U.S.at214;Harris
doctrine),
byBowles
circumstances"
the"unique
MeatPackers,
Inc.,371U.S.215,217(1962)(percuriam)
(recognizing
overruled
, 551U.S.at214.
doctrine),
byBowles
In
45. Recent
thattheCourtmaybe opento a morenuanced
casessuggest
approach.
thequestion
as whether
Henderson
v.Shins
eki,131S. Ct.1197(2011),theCourt
presented
phrased
Thatmight
be an implicit
the 120-day
at issuehad "jurisdictional
deadline
consequences."
the
thatevena nonjurisdictional
rulecouldhavejurisdictional
effects.
However,
acknowledgment
whether
thedeadline
is
instead
backonthequestion
Court
didnotpursue
thispossibility,
falling
theCourt
that
is nonjurisdictional,
stated
ornonjurisdictional.
thedeadline
jurisdictional
Concluding
that
the
itdoesnothavejurisdictional
that
buttheCourt
didnotexplain
attributes,
why.Itappears
TwoCheers
CIVIL
See ScottDodson,
Court
fellbackintothedichotomy.
forHenderson,
simply
1/
ANDFED.COURTS
BLOG(Mar.2,2011),http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/201
PROCEDURE
In Stern
v. Marshall
, 131S. Ct.2594(2011),the
03/commentary-two-cheers-for-henderson.html.
ina separate
andthen
Court
held§ 157(b)(5)
oftheJudicial
Codetobe nonjurisdictional
engaged
was waivable.
TheCourt
theprovision
as to whether
perfunctory)
analysis
(though
relatively
intothe
theprovision
thatit was waivable,
and thusdropped
concluded
however,
entirely
to
thattheCourtis becoming
morereceptive
basket.
Still,thesecasessuggest
nonjurisdictional
asopposed
tobinary,
characterizations.
nuanced,
rules
ofnonjurisdictional
characterization
46. SeeDodson,
supranote7,at6 ("Thisautomatic
... iserroneous.").
astheinverse
ofjurisdictional
rules
from
that"nonjurisdictional
rulesarenotinherently
47. See id.(arguing
having
prohibited
without
rules
canbemandatory
seealsoDane,supranote17,at39("[L]egal
effects");
jurisdictional
being
jurisdictional.").
that
a debtor
andcreditor
48. Cf.Kontrick
v.Ryan,
540U.S.443,457n.12(2004)(noting
may
claims
that
would
other
notbeabletoconsent
totime-barred
prejudice
creditors).
them
49. SeeEberhart
v.United
546U.S.12,19(2005)(calling
States,
"inflexible").
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of exhaustionabsent the state's express waiver.50Federal courts may, in
raise certainnonjurisdictional
defensessua sponte
appropriatecircumstances,
even ifthedefendantforfeited
them.51
The conceptual dichotomy relegates these hybridized outliers to
exceptionalstatus,buttheyhave salutaryroles to play in ourjustice system.As
an institutional
offersa broaderrange of available catematter,hybridization
from
which
the
most
effectscan be selectedand used.
gorizations,
appropriate
Take, forexample,a specificnonjurisdictional
hybridthatI have called a
rule thatcan be
"mandatoryrule."52A mandatoryrule is a nonjurisdictional
or
consented
to.
when
the
rule
is
waived, forfeited,
But,
properlyinvoked,a
court has no discretionto excuse its noncompliance,even for compelling
equitable reasons.53For example, the exhaustionrequirementof the Prison
LitigationReformAct- which states that "no action shall be broughtwith
respectto prisonconditionsunder§ 1983 of thistitle,or any otherFederal law,
remedies as are available are
by a prisoner. . . until such administrative
- is a mandatory
exhausted"54
limitthatcan be waived but
butnonjurisdictional
is notsubjectto courtdiscretion.55
Such a rulehas benefits.Waiver,forfeiture,
and consentallow theparties
to choose whethertherule is somethingworthlitigatingor not.These features
- "I won't challengethisdeadline if you don't
also allow intrasuitsettlements
challenge that deadline." They promote finalityby ensuringthat parties'
decisionsnotto challengenoncompliancewill notlaterbe raisedby thecourtto
unravelmonths(or perhapsyears)of litigation.56
And theycan make a complex
of
litigationmarkedlysimplerby disposing manyissues by consent.57
A mandatoryrule's immunityto discretionand equity also can have
virtues.Rigidityincentivizescompliancewiththerule (or clarityin securinga
waiverof the rule fromthe otherparty).It also promotesfinalityand furthers
reliance interestsif the opposing partyis dependingon the rule. Finally, it
fostersequalityacross cases by preventing
case-specificequitableexcuses and
conservesjudicial resourcesby avoidingthe need forcourtsto grapplewitha
50. 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(3)(2006)("A Stateshallnotbe deemed
to havewaivedthe
exhaustion
orbeestopped
from
reliance
unless
theState,
requirement
upontherequirement
through
waives
therequirement.").
counsel,
expressly
51. See,e.g.,Day v. McDonough,
547 U.S. 198,206-07(2006)(referring
to a habeas
default
under
thenonjurisdictional
andadequate
stategrounds
petitioner's
procedural
independent
doctrine).
52. SeeDodson,
note7.at9.
supra
53. Seeid.at9-10.Anexample
be thesixty-day
notification
oftheResource
might
period
Conservation
andRecovery
which
theSupreme
Court
hasclassified
as
Act,42 U.S.C.§ 6972(b)(1),
without
itsjurisdictional
status.
SeeHallstrom
v.Tillamook
493U.S.
"mandatory"
resolving
County,
20.25-31П989У
54. 42U.S.C.§ 1997e(a).
55. SeeJones
v.Block,
549U.S.199,211(2007).
56. SeeDodson,
note
onthese
7,at10(elaborating
supra
values).
57. SeeStern
v.Marshall,
131S. Ct.2594(2011)(recognizing
this
virtue
ofwaiver).
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host of different
equitable situationsto determinewhetherand under what
circumstances
These featuresof mandatoryrules
noncomplianceis justified.58
can be useful.
Mandatoryrules have downsides- namely,that the equitable circumstances barred fromconsiderationin a particularcase mightbe extremely
- but it seems indisputablethat,in some areas of the law, the
compelling
virtuesof rigiditycan outweighthose of individualfairness.The hybridized
rule"gives rulemakersa tool to choose in thoseareas.
"mandatory
rulesprovestwopoints.The firstis that
of nonjurisdictional
Hybridization
andjurisdictionality
is notso rigid.
thedichotomybetweennonjurisdictionality
The second is thathybridization
can have desirableeffects,such as increasing
thediversity
of optionsavailable forsettingand enforcing
legal norms.
Rules
: HybridizedJurisdictional
C. New Frontiers
One mightrespondthathybridization
makes sense fornonjurisdictional
rules but thathybridizing
rules
is anothermatterentirely.After
jurisdictional
lacks theformalidentityofjurisdictionality
as "power"
all, nonjurisdictionality
of
control.
one
welcome
or
court
Thus,
hybridization
independent party
might
ofjurisdictionalrules.
of nonjurisdictional
rulesyetbe resistant
to hybridization
This reactionis quite sensible in light of the modernconceptualizationof
as special,but it falterson threemajor fronts:theory,history,
jurisdictionality
and modernpractice.
1. Theory
is not, as a matterof theory,as special as the conventional
Jurisdiction
rhetoricmakes it out to be. As Evan Tsen Lee has powerfullyargued,thereis
no inherentconceptual differencebetween jurisdictional doctrines and
issues such as merits59
(and perhapsprocedure).Jurisdiction
nonjurisdictional
cannotmean "power" in the descriptivesense, for a courthas the abilityto
entera judgmentthatthencould be enforcedeven if the courtlacks subjectmatterjurisdiction.60
Instead,jurisdictiongoes to the normativequestion of
in otherwords,"denotesa presumptionin
Jurisdiction,
legitimateauthority.61
favorof thelegitimacyof theprospective
judgment."62
But questions pertainingto the nonjurisdictionalareas of meritsand
procedure also speak to the legitimacyof the judgment. And all three
58. SeeDodson,
note7,at10(explaining
these
virtues).
supra
difference
between
isnohard
59. Lee,supra
note19,at1614("[T]here
jurisdiction
conceptual
andthemerits.").
60. Id. at 1616-17.
Evenif sucha judgment
wouldbe voidforlackof subject-matter
thatmight
stillbe
validjudgment
theissuing
court
stillinfactentered
a purportedly
jurisdiction,
enforced.
61. M at1617.
62. Id.at1622.
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- speak to legitimacyin ways
- merits,procedure,and jurisdiction
categories
that are difficultto distinguishfromeach other. It is true that one could
conceive of jurisdictionas "authorityto decide" and meritsas "authorityto
decide in a particularway,"63but, ultimately,both go to the authorityand
legitimacyof theresulting
judgment.
Consider, for example, the relative legitimacyof the following: A
judgmentthat is correcton the meritsbut renderedby a court that lacks
a judgmentthatis incorrecton themeritsbutrenderedby a court
jurisdiction,64
that has jurisdiction,65
or a judgmentthat seems correcton the meritsand
renderedby a courtthathas jurisdictionbut resultedfroma drasticallyflawed
procedure.66Each scenario has its own illegitimacy(of the forum,of the
verdict,or of the process),and althoughthose illegitimaciescan be framedin
different
ways, theyimplicatethe same concern- namely,the acceptabilityof
the judgment.Consequently,thereis no reason why a defectin jurisdiction
shouldcause any special illegitimacy.
To be sure,particulardefectsmay justifyparticulareffects,but theydo
not hinge on generalizednotionsof "jurisdiction."Thus, protectionof statewhen a stateis not otherwiseinvolved,mighthelp
courtauthority,
particularly
supportthe impositionof nonwaivable featuresfor certainrules, including
such a goal. And,
jurisdictionalrules. But not all jurisdictionalrules further
values
not adequately
rules
are
to
serve
many nonjurisdictional
designed
The
to
a
the
theorize
inability
compellingdistinction
protectedby
parties.67
erodes the special statusthat
betweenjurisdictionality
and nonjurisdictionality
rarefied.68
s
rhetoric
has
jurisdictionality'
Nevertheless,I do believe thatthereare good reasonsto retaina healthy,
- though
and nonjurisdictionality
formaldistinctionbetweenjurisdictionality
makes definitionsmore difficult.I will have more to say about
hybridization
todecide
isjurisdiction
to
63. SeePopev.United
323U.S.1,14(1944)("Jurisdiction
States,
without
make
a wrong
aswellasa right
Dane,supranote17,at33("[A]court
decision.");
jurisdiction
doesnotevenhavetheright
toberight.").
64. Forsupport
seeDobbs,supranote14,at492("Inold-fashioned
ofsucha judgment,
It is unfair
. . . Further,
it is bad
thisis morally
to thewinning
party.
terminology,
wrong.
raises
itis inefficient
as wellas unfair,
anditquiteproperly
administration
ofjustice;
grave
public
doubts
about
thejudicial
system.").
65. Forsomecriticism
seeLee,supranote19,at1623("Suppose
theday
ofsucha judgment,
after
Bushv. Goreitwasrevealed
thatthejustices
in themajority
hadhada covert
telephone
a certain
conservative
conference
callwith
Governor
Bushinwhich
thecandidate
toappoint
promised
hadjurisdiction
tofillthefirst
. . . Clearly
thefact
that
theCourt
overthe
ontheCourt.
jurist
vacancy
matter
forthedecision.").
would
nolonger
secure
legitimacy
subject
66. Formore
effects
ofprocedure,
Procedural
Justice
onthelegitimacy
seeLawrence
Solum,
,
78S.CAL.L.REV.181(2004).
67. Nonjurisdictional
be nonwaivable
rules,forexample,
bankruptcy
mayproperly
bya
ifother
540U.S.443,457n.12
creditor
willbe affected.
SeeKontrick
v. Ryan,
creditors'
interests
this
(2004)(acknowledging
point).
68. Formoreon thevalueof legitimate
see generally
Raz,Legitimate
Joseph
authority,
ofLaw:EssaysonLawandMorality( 1979).
, inTheAuthority
Authority
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that below.69For now, my point is just that the difficultyin conceptually
and nonjurisdictional
jurisdictionalauthority
segregating
authority
suggeststhat
and nonjurisdictionality
are more linkable than they might
jurisdictionality
otherwisebe thought.
2. History
has changedover time,and the
Historically,the idea of jurisdictionality
rhetoricof jurisdictionalityas somethingspecial is a relativelymodern
conceptualization.As Laura Fitzgerald has shown, English equity courts
createdtheirown subject-matter
jurisdictionby developingtheirown equitable
defensesand formsof relief,whichthengave equitycourtsjurisdictionto hear
and decide common-lawclaims.70Similarly,Dan Dobbs has demonstrated
that
was
often
consented
to
in
courts.71
jurisdiction
English
Even U.S. courtshave notalways treatedjurisdictiontheway theytreatit
today. Fitzgeraldhas argued that Article III incorporatedthe flexibilityof
Federal courtsdid not emphasizethe rigidityof
Englishequityjurisdiction.72
until around 1900.73 As a result,as Michael Collins has
jurisdictionality
recounted,"certain of the qualities commonlyassociated with the federal
courts'concededlylimitedsubjectmatterjurisdictionremainedless thanfully
settledthroughout
muchof thenation'shistory."74
A primeexample is thepre-twentieth
centuryuse of pleadingpracticeto
establishjurisdiction,a practicethat leftjurisdiction'sestablishmentlargely
withinthe parties' controland subject to theirconsentand waiver.75Before
and it was a
1875, "waiver of jurisdictionalobjectionswas commonplace,"76
settled
rule
that
could
admit
At common
facts."77
"long
parties
jurisdictional
a
who
raised
a
in
abatement
a
law, party
plea
challenging jurisdictionalissue
conceded the merits,78and other proceduralrules preventedparties from
As a result,"federal
challengingjurisdictionunder certaincircumstances.79
69. Seeinfra
text
notes
236-38.
accompanying
70. SeeLauraS. Fitzgerald,
Is Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional
?,95NW.U.L.REV.1207,1253-54
ofequity
defined
their
ownsubject
matter
(2001)("So,too,courts
jurisdiction
bydeveloping
unique
substantive
defenses
totheenforcement
ofrights
atcommon
created
law.").
71. Dobbs,
note
supra
24,at51.
72. SeeFitzgerald,
III
therelationship
between
Article
supranote70,at1208-09
(discussing
andEnglish
equity-court
traditions).
73. Dane,supra
note17,at99-105(tracing
this
history).
74. Collins,
note12,at1831.
supra
75. Id.at1832.
76. Id.at1876.
77. Dobbs,
note14,at511.
supra
78. See BENJAMIN
ROBBINSCURTIS,JURISDICTION,
AND PECULIAR
PRACTICE,
Jurisprudence
oftheCourtsoftheUnitedStates126(1880);James
Gould,ATreatiseon
theprinciples
ofPleadinginCivilActions300( 1832).
79. See,e.g.,Hartog
v.Memory,
116U.S.588,590(1886)("Neither
hastheright
...
party
without
attheproper
time
andintheproper
theonly
of
evidence,
pleading
way,tointroduce
purpose
which
is tomakeouta casefor[jurisdictional]
Thiswasnotnecessarily
a consistent
dismissal.").
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courtscontinuedto hear cases even when it became clear thatjurisdictionmay
have been lacking in fact,or even concocted."80It was not until 1936 that
attainedand solidifiedthespecial staturethatis conventionally
jurisdictionality
it today.81This statureis therefore
characterize
to
quite recentin light
thought
ofjurisdiction'slonghistory.
3. ModernPractice
In additionto theoryand historicalpractice,certainfeaturesof current
As a matterof existing
practiceunderminethespecial statusofjurisdictionality.
makes
it out to be. I will
as
as
the
rhetoric
is
not
doctrine,
pure
jurisdictionality
describethe impuritiesin more detail in PartII, but threebriefexamples will
help setthestage.
to DetermineJurisdiction
a. Jurisdiction
The first example is the odd doctrine "jurisdiction to determine
The idea behindit is thata courtnecessarilyneeds some power
jurisdiction."82
to decide whetherit has jurisdictionor not.83The traditionalview of this
doctrineis that a federal court actually has subject-matter
jurisdictionfor
and
But onlytheConstitution
purposesof decidingthejurisdictionalquestion.84
a
and
federal
court
can
subject-matter
jurisdiction,
Congress together
give
nothing suggests that they have done so for such purposes.85Instead,
and its
"jurisdictionto determinejurisdiction"is a judge-made "bootstrap,"86
existencerunscontraryto the limitednatureof federaljurisdiction,which is
This traditional
supposedlyimmunefromcourtcontroland policynecessities.87
a transition
between
1875and 1936,whentheCourtwentthrough
periodregarding
position
a party's
v. Gilmer,
129U.S. 315,326-29(1889)(allowing
See,e.g.,Morris
jurisdictionality.
otherwise
tardy
iurisdictional
challenge).
80. Collins,
note12,at1877.
supra
withthe
thatculminated
thatthe1875Actbegana trend
81. See id.at 1834(explaining
in1936).
McNutt
decision
modern
onthetopic,
seeDobbs,
82. Fora seminal
article
supranote14.Foranauthoritative
PRINCIPLES
OFCIVIL
PROCEDURE
seeKEVIN
M.CLERMONT,
treatment,
§§ 4.4,5.1(2ded.2009).
Colo.& SantaFe Ry.Co.,270U.S.266,274(1925)
83. SeeTex.& Рас.Ry.Co.v. Gulf,
theconditions
essential
toits
haspower
todetermine
whether
court
ofgeneral
("Every
jurisdiction
RichardH.Fallon et al., HartandWechsler'sTheFederalCourtsand
exercise
exist.");
hasjurisdiction
todecide
whether
court
theFederalSystem
1580(4thed.1996)("Afederal
always
ithasjurisdiction.").
a court
has
that
v.United
MineWorkers,
330U.S.258(1947)(holding
84. SeeUnited
States
thestatus
thejurisdictional
issueisbeing
toissuelawful
topreserve
quowhile
jurisdiction
injunctions
decided).
and
thatoncea court
is established
85. Butsee bager,
supranote18,at 22 (asserting
from
itsvery
status
as
a group
some
todecide
ofcases,itnecessarily
acquires
jurisdiction
empowered
inthegrant
ofjurisdiction
is"implicit
orgrants
a court"
andthat
todecide
"jurisdiction
jurisdiction"
which
thecourt
isfounded").
upon
Doctrine
L. KEV.
86. See Note,ResJudicata
andJurisdiction:
lhe Bootstrap
, 53 HARV.
652(1940).Theterm
wasmadefamous
byDobbs,
supranote14.
M.Clermont,
theIssues
87. Fora recent
ofthedoctrine,
seeKevin
for
Sequencing
exploration
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to determine
view of "jurisdiction
jurisdiction"thusshows thatjurisdictionality
is moremalleablethanitpresupposes.
A slightlydifferent
perspectiveof "jurisdictionto determine
jurisdiction"
is thatit is essentiallya doctrineof issue preclusion,88
or, as perhapsmore
In this formulation,
appropriatelycast, a "rule of jurisdictionalfinality."89
the primarypoint of the doctrineis
which is reflectedin the Restatement,90
of jurisdictiononce a judgmentis rendered.In
usuallyto precluderelitigation
of the renderingcourt's subjectshort,a judgmentoftenprecludesrelitigation
matter jurisdiction, even if the rendering court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction.91
Even as a kindof preclusiondoctrine,however,the"ruleofjurisdictional
finality"says somethingaboutjurisdiction.Afterall, a traditionalhallmarkof
jurisdictionis that a judgmententeredby a court that lacks
subject-matter
The "rule of
subject-matter
jurisdictionis void and has no preclusiveeffect.92
that
is
a
created
exception93 grantspreclusive
jurisdictionalfinality" judicially
effecton thequestionof subject-matter
jurisdiction,and thisis trueeven if the
courtwas neverchallengedexpressly.The doctrine
jurisdictionof therendering
softensthetypicaleffectsofjurisdictionality,
thelack of whichshouldresultin
a void and nonpreclusive
judgment.94

Preclusion
Judicial
Limitations
Jurisdictional
andIntrasuit
, 63FLA.
Primacy
Decisionmaking:
from
L.REV.301,317-18(2011).
andpreclusion.
88. There
aresomedifferences
between
todetermine
"jurisdiction
jurisdiction"
to
See CLERMONT,
5.1(A)(l)-(3)(distinguishing
jurisdiction
supranote82,at §§ 4.4(B)(2)-(3),
from
claim
andissuepreclusion).
determine
jurisdiction
89. Durfee
v.Duke,
375U.S.106,115(1963).Perhaps
thefirst
casearticulating
thisprinciple
v.Sullivant
that
a judgment
wasres
wasMcCormick
, 23U.S.(10Wheat.)
192,199(1825)(holding
evenifissued
without
judicata
subject-matter
jurisdiction).
a court
hasrendered
90. Restatement
§ 12,at115 ( 1982)("When
(Second)ofJudgments
ofthe
a judgment
ina contested
theparties
from
thequestion
thejudgment
action,
precludes
litigating
ina subsequent
court's
matter
certain
[under
conditions].").
subject
jurisdiction
litigation
except
91. SeeChicot
Dist.v.Baxter
308U.S.371,376(1940)("[Federal
State
Bank,
Cnty.
Drainage
determinations
of [whether
to heara case]maynotbe assailed
courts']
theyhavejurisdiction
Stollv.Gottlieb,
305U.S.165,171(1938);seealsoClermont,
supranote87,at317
collaterally.");
anddetermined,
eveniferroneously,
theissueofjurisdiction
ornotice
wasactually
("Because
litigated
There
tobe some
thedefendant
cannot
thesameissueinsubsequent
appear
relitigate
litigation.").
the
attack
under
See Kalbv. Feuerstein,
308 U.S. 433 (1940)(allowing
collateral
exceptions.
outthree
OFJUDGMENTS
Act);RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
§ 12,at 115(1982)(setting
Bankruptcy
willnot
thata jurisdictional
Clermont,
ruling
exceptions);
supranote87,at 318(acknowledging
"inspecial
suchas where
thecourt
lacked
circumstances,
plainly
subject-matter
preclude
relitigation
of another
courtor
or where
thejudgment
on theauthority
substantially
jurisdiction
infringes
agency").
92. SeeDobbs,
note14,at496n.31(expressing
this
"traditional
view").
supra
Error
as anExcess
93. Preclusion
lawisjudicially
created.
SeeDanB. Dobbs,TrialCourt
of
Jurisdiction
,43TEX.L.REV.854,882-90(1965).
the
affirmative
defense.
SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 8(c).Thus,
94. Preclusion
is a nonjurisdictional
todetermine
isestablished
ofthe
effect
of"jurisdiction
operative
onlybytheinvocation
jurisdiction"
defense
ofthedefense.
anditmaybeavoided
waiver
orforfeiture
preclusion
bya party,
bya party's
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The justificationforthe "rule ofjurisdictionalfinality"helps explainthat
way. Preclusionis necessary,the
softeningin a decidedlyun-jurisdiction-like
SupremeCourthas explained,to curtailendless litigationabout subject-matter
jurisdiction.95A more pragmatic and sensible justificationcould not be
which usually
to jurisdictionality,
conceived,but it is nonethelessantithetical
That
jurisdictionalitymust
marginalizessuch considerationsto irrelevancy.
yield in such an event suggests that it is not as resistantto practical
considerations
as thetropemightsuggest.
b. Resequencing
The second exampleis therecentlydevelopeddoctrineof resequencing.96
The traditionalconceptionof jurisdictionis that it must be resolved at the
mattersuntil
outset- thecourtcannotproceedto decide othernonjurisdictional
This conceptualization
reflectsa temporal
ithas satisfieditselfofjurisdiction.97
and nonjurisdicbetweenjurisdictionality
manifestation
of therigiddistinction
of
with
the
it
And
coincides
"power" conception jurisdiction,without
tionality.
whichthecourtlacks thepowerto resolveotherissues.98
But thisrigidityhas softenedin recentcases, in whichthe SupremeCourt
has expressed a willingness to allow lower courts to resolve a case on
proceduralgroundseven when jurisdictionalissues remain
nonjurisdictional
In SinochemInternationalCo. v. Malay InternationalShipping
unresolved.99
for
Corp.,
example, the Court allowed the dismissal of a case under the
proceduraldoctrineof forumnon convenienswithoutfirst
nonjurisdictional
At the same time,
jurisdiction.100
establishingthe existenceof subject-matter
thatthere
v. Duke,375U.S. 106,113-14(1963)("Itisjustas important
95. SeeDurfee
a party
After
hashisdayin
bea placetobegin
there
should
bea placetoendasthat
should
litigation.
attack
hisevidence
andhisviewofthelaw,a collateral
with
topresent
court,
uponthe
opportunity
theissuepreviously
rendered
retries
as tojurisdiction
there
decision
determined.")
(quoting
merely
it"quite
a valuable
toolin
Stoll
, 305U.S.at 172);seealsoDobbs,supranote14,at499(calling
wasteful
stopping
litigation").
seeClermont,
ofthesubject,
96. Forextended
treatments
Elliott,
supranote87;Heather
The
C. Idleman,
andRestraint
Jurisdictional
, 43NEWENG.L. REV.725(2009);Scott
Resequencing
L.REV.1(2001);Peter
intheFederal
Courts
, 87CORNELL
Resequencing
ofJurisdictional
Emergence
B. Rutledge,
Decisional
,62Ala. L.REV.1(2010).
Sequencing
& LakeMich.Ry.Co.v. Swan,111U.S.379,382(1884)
97. SeeMansfield,
Coldwater
seealsoCollins,
atallinanycause.");
cannot
thecourt
("Without
supranote12,
proceed
jurisdiction
a "first
at1830-31
principle").
(calling
jurisdiction
fora Better
98. See SteelCo. v. Citizens
Env't,523 U.S. 83, 94-95(1998)("The
thenature
andlimits
matter
from
as a threshold
that
beestablished
springs
requirement
jurisdiction
andwithout
States
andis inflexible
ofthejudicial
oftheUnited
exception.");
cf.Exparte
power
thelaw.").
ispower
todeclare
74U.S.(7 Wall.)506,514(1868)("Jurisdiction
McCardle,
a competing
99. SeeFitzgerald,
cases,forming
supranote70,at 1207("Butinsignificant
viewfora
hasexchanged
with
itsowndeeproots,
theCourt
tradition
[its]formal,
jurisdiction-first
more
malleable
. . . .").
approach
Int'lCo. v. Malaylnt'1Shipping
100. See Sinochem
Corp.,549 U.S. 422,431 (2007)
without
first
nonconveniens
doctrine
dismissal
under
theforum
establishing
subject-matter
(allowing
dismissal
OilCo.,526U.S.574,583-88(1999)(allowing
AGv.Marathon
cfRuhrgas
jurisdiction);
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the Court has insistedthat satisfactionof jurisdictionis a prerequisitefor
decidingthemeritsof a case.101
Resequencing thus shiftsthe line from between jurisdictionalityand
to between jurisdictionalityand merits. The division
nonjurisdictionality
betweenjurisdictionand meritsleaves out a broad swathof nonjurisdictional
proceduralissues (such as forumnon conveniens)thatcould be lumpedin with
jurisdictionalissues for resequencing purposes.102In resequencing,then,
mattersof jurisdictionare not so special afterall.103They share commonality
withnonjurisdictional
mattersof procedureas well, and thatcommonalityis
expressedin termsof malleability.
c. DiscretionaryDeclinationofJurisdiction
The thirdexample is in the judicially created discretion,which courts
repeatedlyexercise, to decline jurisdiction.If jurisdictionis a "virtually
federalcourtsseem to have missed the memo. As
unflaggingobligation,"104
David Shapiro has shown, federal courts routinelychoose not to exercise
even ifjurisdictionis proper,and despitethecommonrhetoricthat
jurisdiction,
Abstentiondoctrinesare themain
jurisdictionis not subjectto courtcontrol.105
and
with
the
Court
even requiring,lower federal
culprit,
Supreme
allowing,
courtsto dismisscases whenjurisdictionis properbecause of theconsideration
of othervalues.106But otherdoctrinesexistas well, such as prudentialstanding
without
Amchem
forlackofpersonal
first
Prods.,
jurisdiction
establishing
subject-matter
jurisdiction);
classcertification
determinations
Inc.v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591,612 (1997)(calling
"logically
IIIstanding
antecedent"
toArticle
issues).
toissuea
isvitalonlyifthecourt
101. SeeSinochem
, 549U.S.at431("Jurisdiction
proposes
RichardH. Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler'sTheFederal
onthemerits.");
judgment
a basisfor
failstodisclose
CourtsandtheFederalSystem1412(6thed.2009)("Iftherecord
unless
the
ofthemerits
ofthecontroversy
thecourt
must
determination
federal
suspend
jurisdiction,
failure
canbecured.")
added).
(emphasis
thatresequencing
allowsa courtto dismiss
on
102. Clermont,
supranote87 (arguing
andvenuebefore
suchas abstention,
classcertification,
exhaustion,
any
procedural
questions
determination).
jurisdictional
infavor
inthat
ofa
thelatter
canbebypassed
103. True,
differs
from
jurisdiction
procedure
haveitsownspecial
Seeid.Jurisdiction
merits
determination
whiletheformer
cannot.
mayindeed
areoverstated.
Butmypoint
here
ismerely
tosuggest
that
those
quirks
quirks.
424 U.S. 800,817(1976);see also
Cons.Dist.v. United
104. Colo.RiverWater
States,
todecline
the
v. Virginia,
19U.S.(6 Wheat.)
Cohens
264,404(1821)("Wehavenomoreright
that
is notgiven.
Theoneortheother
which
is given,
thantousurp
which
exercise
ofjurisdiction
totheconstitution.").
would
betreason
105. SeeDavidL. Shapiro,
Jurisdiction
andDiscretion
, 60N.Y.U.L. REV.543,545(1985)
drawn
ofan overriding
obligation,
subject
onlyandat mostto a fewnarrowly
("[Suggestions
inmatters
ofjurisdiction.");
intheir
ofjudicial
discretion
arefartoogrudging
exceptions,
recognition
L. REV.971,990(2009)(discussing
seealsoFrederic
M.Bloom,
Jurisdiction's
NobleLie, 61STAN.
inthecontext
ofjurisdictional
abstention
obligation).
ETAL.,
Forindictments
ofabstention
onthese
106. SeeFALLON
supranote101,at1049-152.
ABranch
theAbstention
Doctrine
TooFar:Pruning
seeLindaS.Mullenix,
,75GEO.L.J.99,
grounds,
andtheLimits
103-04(1986);Martin
H. Redish,
Abstention,
ofPowers,
oftheJudicial
Separation
Function,
,94Yale L.J.71(1984).
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and thejudiciallycreatedjusticiabilitydoctrineof decliningjurisdictionover a
case despiteauthorization
to hear the case underArticleIII.107This discretion
demonstrates
thatjurisdiction'sunique ideal of isolationand impenetrability
is
attainedless frequently
thanitpurports.
II.
Hybridized Jurisdiction: A Taxonomy
For these reasons,we should rethinkjurisdictionand its relationshipto
nonjurisdictionalvalues and effects.Jurisdictionneed not be cast as so
inflexible,isolated,and special. In thisPart,I beginthatprocessby developing
a taxonomyto framethe various ways thatjurisdictionality
can incorporate,
link with,and relate to elementsof nonjurisdictionality.
No doubt thereare
otherways to classifyand groupthe different
I offer
typesof hybridizations,
my particulartaxonomyto spur further
thinkingon the topic,not to maintain
thatmyclassificationsoperateto theexclusionof others.
A. IncorporatedHybridization
The form of hybridizationwith the strongestconnection between
involves jurisdictional rules and
jurisdictionalityand nonjurisdictionality
doctrinesthat, as a matterof their own definitionsor conceptualizations,
features.Incorporationcan occur as a matterof
incorporatenonjurisdictional
judicial doctrineor as a matterof statutory
expression.
1. DoctrinalIncorporation
The quintessentialjurisdictionaldoctrinethat incorporatesnonjurisdictional featuresis personal jurisdiction.In its modern conception,personal
jurisdiction"representsa restrictionon judicial power not as a matterof
but as a matterof individualliberty."108
Because of thisbasis, the
sovereignty
of personaljurisdictioncan, like otherpersonalrights,be waived,
requirement
consentedto, or forfeited.109
It is even subjectto estoppelprinciplesimposed
107. See, e.g.,Warth
422 U.S. 490,501(1975).Fordiscussions
v. Seldin,
ofprudential
seeFALLON
ETAL.,supranote101,at 128-29;William
A. Fletcher,
TheStructure
standing,
of
,98YaleL.J.221,251-53(1988).
Standing,
108. Ins.Corp.ofIr.,Ltd.v.Compagnie
desBauxites
deGuinee,
456U.S.694,702(1982)
that
a court
havepersonal
flows
notfrom
Art.Ill,butfrom
theDue
("Therequirement
jurisdiction
Process
Clause.Thepersonal
anindividual
andprotects
jurisdiction
requirement
recognizes
liberty
The traditional
of personal
of course,was one of
interest.").
conceptualization
jurisdiction,
andterritorial
SeePennoyer
v.Neff,
95U.S.714,720(1877)("The
power
governmental
sovereignty.
ofevery
tribunal
is necessarily
restricted
itis
limits
oftheStateinwhich
authority
bytheterritorial
established.
toexercise
those
limits
wouldbedeemed
inevery
other
Anyattempt
authority
beyond
as hasbeensaidbythiscourt,
anillegitimate
ofpower,
andberesisted
as mere
forum,
assumption
326U.S.310(1945).Fora recent
of
discussion
abuse."),
abrogated
byInt'lShoeCo.v.Washington,
thedoctrine,
seeA. Benjamin
Jurisdiction
toAdjudicate:
A Revised
, 73U.CHI.L.
Spencer,
Analysis
REV.617(2006).
109. SeeIns.Corp.,
456U.S.at703-04(discussing
both
andimplied
FED.R.
waiver);
express
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under the aegis of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's sanctions
provisions.110It is therefore a jurisdictional doctrine that inherently
features.
incorporates
nonjurisdictional
The takeaway from personal jurisdiction is revolutionary:doctrinal
to
essentiallybroadensthe definitionalscope of jurisdictionality
incorporation
include nonjurisdictionalmatters. Either personal jurisdiction is not
or personaljurisdictionis a kindof hybrid.Viewingpersonal
jurisdictional,111
a
as
definitionalhybridis a fundamentallydifferentkind of
jurisdiction
of
conceptualization jurisdictionthan that to which we are accustomed.If
jurisdictioncan incorporatenonjurisdictionalfeatures,then it is no longer
limitedto therigidset of characteristics
associatedwithjurisdiction.
currently
the
door
to
of the
Doctrinalincorporation
opens
broadeningour understanding
natureofjurisdiction.
2. Statutory
Incorporation
Personaljurisdiction,though,could be cast as an anomalybecause of its
nexus to the Due Process Clause and its separatejurisdictionalstatus and
because it is not subject-matter
jurisdiction,which is the power of the court
of one party'swishes.
overthecause irrespective
whichis whyI have describedit
Perhapspersonaljurisdictionis different,
separately(though I will have more to say about the scope of doctrinal
jurisdiction
incorporationlater). But that does not mean that subject-matter
cannotincorporatenonjurisdictional
featurestoo. Congress,afterall, controls
thesubject-matter
jurisdictionof thefederalcourts,and thereis no reasonwhy
it could notdrawthosejurisdictionalboundarieswithnonjurisdictional
features
in mind. Congress can thenauthorizethese boundariesto move, or perhaps
bulge,based on partyconductor equityor judicial discretion.This may result
in jurisdictionalboundariesthatare morecircuitousthanstraight,
but theyare
no less jurisdictional.112

ClV.P. 12(h)(1)
for
waiver
ofthepersonal
defense).
jurisdiction
(providing
110. See id. at 705-06(estopping
thedefendant
from
thepersonal
jurisdiction
asserting
defense
asa sanction
forfailing
tocomply
with
jurisdictional
discovery
requests).
butI remain
for
111. I amopentothischaracterization
ofpersonal
agnostic
jurisdiction,
then
I aimheretoshowthatifthedoctrine
isjurisdictional,
ofthisArticle.
hybridization
purposes
a viableexplanation
of howthatcharacterization
can makesenseandof whatthat
provides
forourconceptualization
characterization
then
means
ofjurisdictionality.
that
a time
limit
that
... didexplicitly
112. SeeDane,supra
note17,at65( [IJmagine
provide
thelineso
itwould
intheevent
Is there
that
would
notapply
ofexcusable
anything
prevent
neglect.
itwould
bea complicated,
evendifficult,
drawn
from
jurisdictional
being
jurisdictional?
Admittedly,
anddifficult.");
ScottDodson,
line.Butmany
linesarecomplicated
Appreciating
jurisdictional
: A Replyto Critics
Rules
, 102NW.U. L. REV.COLLOQUY
225,229-30(2008),
Mandatory
a similar
http://www.law.northwestern.edU/lawreview/Colloquy/2008/7
(making
point).
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113
A readyexample is § 2107. Section 2107(a) statesthatno appeal shall
bringa judgmentforreview unless a notice of appeal has been filed within
thirtydays of the judgment.114The Court has held that deadline to be
Section2107(a) by itselfseems fairlyclear,simple,and easily
jurisdictional.115
characterizedas jurisdictional:unless a notice is filedwithinthirtydays, the
courtof appeals has no jurisdiction.
Section 2107(c), however,complicatesmatters.That provisionallows a
courtto extendthethirty-day
deadline"upon a showingof excusableneglector
good cause."116 The power to extend the deadline can be exercised
even if the motionto extendis filedafterthe expirationof the
retroactively,
initialthirty-day
deadline.117Section 2107(c) also allows a districtcourt to
the
deadline
"reopen"
retroactively
upon a findingthatthe putativeappellant
did not receive timelynotice of the judgmentand that no partywould be
The statutory
prejudiced.118
jurisdictionallimit thus expresslycontemplates
discretion
and
considerations
of equity.
judicial
It is truethatthestatutory
powersto tinkerwiththejurisdictionaldeadline
under§ 2107(c) are given to the districtcourtratherthanthe appellatecourt,
butCongresscould have giventhemto theappellatecourt,and thedifference
is
immaterialformypurposeshere.The generalpointwould be thesame in either
case: the appellatedeadlinemay be jurisdictional,but its boundaryis affected
by the equitable discretionof the federalcourtsand on partyconduct(as in
makingan appropriateand timelymotion).The statuteexpresslyincorporates
featuresintoitsjurisdictionallimit.
nonjurisdictional
At firstblush,thisstatutory
in appellatejurisdictionseems
hybridization
odd because considerationsof equityand judicial discretionare antitheticalto
jurisdictionalcustom. But, to reiterate,nothinginherentin jurisdictionality
preventsthis kind of incorporation.Nonjurisdictionalconsiderationsmay
createbulges in thejurisdictionalline, but thatdoes not make the line itself
any less jurisdictional.
3. ImpliedIncorporation
The civil appellate deadline in § 2107(c) is an obvious candidate for
incorporatedhybridizationbecause it expressly permitsextensions of the
deadline based on the discretionary
factorof "good
jurisdictionalthirty-day
113. Another
be 28 U.S.C.§ 1367(c)(2006),which
allowsdistrict
courts
example
might
discretion
todecline
toexercise
I discuss
detail
below.
§ 1367(c)inmore
supplemental
jurisdiction.
Seeinfra
text
notes
214-227.
accompanying
114. 28U.S.C.§ 2107(a).
v.Russell,
115. Bowles
551U.S.205,214(2007)("Today
clearthat
thetimely
wemake
filing
ofa notice
ofappeal
ina civilcaseisajurisdictional
requirement.").
116. 28U.S.C.§ 2107(c).
117. Id.(stating
that
themotion
"notlater
than
30daysafter
theexpiration
ofthe
maybefiled
time
otherwise
setfor
bringing
appeal").
118. Id.
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cause." The textitselfexplicitlyincorporates
features,so the
nonjurisdictional
follows.
characterization
naturally
But what if the textis not so clear? In a less clear case, the taxonomy
thatis implicit,ifnotexplicit.
hybridization
mightmake roomforincorporated
Those who subscribeto interpretive
tools thatgo beyondexpresstermsmight
The critical
findlittledifferencebetweenexpress and impliedhybridization.
I
want
is
one's
to
here
whatever
that,
preferred
interpretive
point
highlight
limit
a
as
the
mere
characterization
of
statutory
jurisdictional
methodology,
of nonjurisdictional
features.
does notprecludeimplicitincorporation
incorporation"
categoryto statutes
Expandingthe taxonomy's"statutory
with implicit incorporationmight address a number of troublesome
circumstances.JusticeHugo Black's dissentfromthe denial of certiorariin
In
Teague v. Regional Commissionerof Customsillustratesone possibility.119
thatcase, the petitionerfiled two days outside § 2101 's ninety-daystatutory
because an unusually severe
deadline to file a petition for certiorari120
snowstormdelayed the mail for fourdays.121The statutedid not expressly
encompassan exceptionforuntimelypetitions,but JusticeBlack nevertheless
would have allowed thepetition.He wrote:
I agree,of course,thatwe shouldfollowthe statute.But we mustfirst
determinewhat the statutemeans.. . . [The Court] suggests] thatthe
statutedeprivesthisCourtof all powerto hearcases filedafterthe90day period,regardlessof whetherthedelaywas caused by snowstorms
of the mails impossible.Under no known
makingthe transportation
of
of
construction
can such an interpretation
principle
statutory
that
the
The
statute
does
not
be
§ 2101(c)
say explicitly
supported.
time limitation may be inapplicable under certain extenuating
circumstancesbut it also does not say that the time limitmust be
ruthlesslyapplied in every conceivable situation,withoutregardto
hardshipsinvolved or extenuatingcircumstancespresent.The Court
of the
therefore
mustdecide what is the more sensible interpretation
statute.I forone cannotthinkof anypurposeCongressmighthave had
thatcould possiblybe servedby holdingthata litigantcan be defeated
beyondhis control.122
solelybecause of a delaythatwas entirely
limit
PerhapsJusticeBlack was arguingforan exceptionto the statutory
If so, thatargument
would have been at odds
based on equitableconsiderations.
forequitycannotovercomea
withthe modernconceptionof jurisdictionality,

119. 394U.S.977(1969).
120. 28U.S.C.§2101.
121. Teaguev. Reg'lComm'r
of Customs,
394 U.S. 977,977,981 (1969)(Black,J.,
a denial
A related
dissent
from
of
is Justice
from
denial
ofcertiorari).
example
Douglas's
dissenting
that
thecertiorari
inDealv.Cincinnati
Bd.ofEduc
certiorari
.,402U.S.962,962-64(1971)(arguing
wouldhavebeen
thepetition
fora petition
filedonedaylatebecause
deadline
should
be excused
ifnotlostbythecourier).
timely
ofcertiorari).
122. Teague
from
denial
,394U.S.at982-83(Black,
J.,dissenting
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jurisdictionalbar. But if jurisdictionalitycan be hybridized,and if that
hybridizationcan be implied, then Justice Black's argument can be
characterizedin a different
One need notargue
way thatis farmoresatisfying.
for a judicially created exception at all. Rather, one can construe the
jurisdictionalstatuteas implicitlyincorporatingnonjurisdictionalfeatures,
much as § 2107(c) does expressly.Following that implicithybridizationis
consistentwithjurisdictionality,
notcontrary
to it.123
One mightrightfully
here
on
the
object
groundthatimplicitincorporation
looks a lot likejudicial derogationofjurisdictionallimits.I do not
functionally
meanto sanctionjudicial disregardof statutory
limits,whetherjurisdictionalor
not. But I do mean to argue that a jurisdictionalstatutecan incorporate
features,such as equityand discretion.And if one believes
nonjurisdictional
thatstatutory
directivescan be implicitas well as explicit,thenthereis no
reason why those implieddirectivescannotbe hybridizations.
Under such an
a
statute
to implicitly
interpretivemethodology,construing jurisdictional
featurescan be justifiedas followingthe statute,
incorporatenonjurisdictional
ratherthanbeing in derogationof it. The pointhere is thatthingsmay depend
but they ought not
upon one's preferredmethodof statutoryinterpretation,
the
nature
of
the
at
statute
hand.
dependupon jurisdictional
B. LinkedHybridization
A second formof hybridization
is not inherently
or textuallyincorporated
into jurisdictionalcontours but instead manifestsitself througha direct
connectionbetween jurisdictionalityand nonjurisdictionality.
This "linked
hybridization"
encompassesjurisdictionalrules and doctrinesthatare tied to
rules or doctrinesin ways thatconditionjurisdictionality
on
nonjurisdictional
occurrences.
Linked
unlike
nonjurisdictional
hybridization,
incorporated
treatsthejurisdictionaland nonjurisdictional
featuresas coupled
hybridization,
but distinct,allowing them to be segregated analyticallyfor differential
treatment.
Thereare two subspeciesin thiscategory:triggers
and preconditions.
1. Triggers
Triggersare nonjurisdictional
timingmechanismsforcontrolling
jurisdictional questions.The triggerdoes not affectthe answer to the jurisdictional
questionexceptto the extentthatthe answerchangesbased on whenthe question is answered.In visual terms,thejurisdictionalbulletfiresonly when the
is pulled.Nothingcan stopthebulletonce thetriggeris pulled,butwhen
trigger
and how thattrigger
is pulledis subjectto nonjurisdictional
considerations.
The quintessentialtriggeris the time-of-invocation
rule. The traditional
ofjurisdictionis thatitmustbe establishedat thetimea party
conceptualization
123. Fora related
discussion
ofTeague
andjurisdictional
time
seeDane,supranote17,
limits,
at18-20(arguing
that
limits
neednotbereadliterally
andmercilessly).
jurisdictional
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invokesthefederalforum.124
This time-of-invocation
ruleis consistentwiththe
if
of
a
court
lacks
"power" theory jurisdiction:
jurisdiction,it has no authority
to do anything
otherthandismiss.125
its
connectionto judicial power, the time-of-invocation
rule is
Despite
itselfa nonjurisdictional
rule.In otherwords,thetime-of-invocation
rulecan be
shiftedor discarded based on traditionallynonjurisdictional
justifications.
Shifting the rule can make a profound difference in jurisdictional
determinations
because developmentsin cases as theyprogresscan change
entitlements.
Thus, for example, a case between non-diverse
jurisdictional
partieswitha federalclaim and a relatedstateclaim thatis filedor removedto
federalcourtbased on federal-question
jurisdictioncan stay in federalcourt
even afterthe federalquestion claim is dismissedbecause jurisdictionwas
settledat thetimeof invocation.126
Similarly,a case thatoriginallyhad no basis
forfederaljurisdictionand thuswas filedin statecourtcan, ifit lateracquiresa
basis for federal jurisdiction,be removed to federal court because the
jurisdictionalquestionwas settlednot at thetimeof statefilingbut at thetime
of federalremoval.127
One can quibble over the proper temporal place for jurisdictional
butI am notconcernedwiththatissue here.Rather,thecritical
determinations,
featureof the time-of-invocation
rule for my purposes is that the rule is
The
Court
confirmed
its nonjurisdictionalcharacter in
nonjurisdictional.
128
in
Inc.
v.
which
a
case
was removedto federalcourton
Lewis,
Caterpillar
groundsof diversity
jurisdiction,but in facta non-diversedefendantexistedat
the time of removal.Accordingly,at the timewhenjurisdictionshould have
been assessed,thecourtlackedjurisdiction.Later,thejurisdictionaldefectwas
124. Molíanv. Torrance,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
thatthe
537,539(1824)("Itis quiteclear,
oftheCourt
ofthings
atthetime
oftheaction
andthat
jurisdiction
depends
uponthestate
brought,
after
itcannot
beousted
vesting,
bysubsequent
events.").
125. SteelCo.v.Citizens
fora Better
523U.S.83,94-95(1998)("Therequirement
that
Env't,
beestablished
asa threshold
matter
from
thenature
andlimits
ofthejudicial
jurisdiction
springs
power
oftheUnited
States
andis inflexible
andwithout
Ontheother
theruleallowsa
hand,
exception.").
federal
court
toheara caseinwhich
wasestablished
atthetimeofinvocation
evenif
jurisdiction
events
would
Seeinfra
text
note126.
subsequent
destroy
jurisdiction.
accompanying
126. SeeGrupo
Dataflux
v.AtlasGlobal
L.P.,541U.S.567,583-84(2004)(Ginsburg,
Grp.,
haslongapplied
Marshall's
rulecategorically
topostfiling
J.,dissenting)
("TheCourt
time-of-filing
that
otherwise
would
St.PaulMercury
Indem.
Co.v. Red
changes
destroy
diversity
jurisdiction.");
CabCo.,303U.S.283,294-95(1938)("Ituniformly
ina suitproperly
hasbeenheldthat
inthe
begun
federal
court
thechange
ofcitizenship
ofa party
doesnotoustthejurisdiction.
Thesamerulegoverns
a suitoriginally
ina state
court
andremoved
toa federal
id.at289-90("Events
court.");
brought
totheinstitution
ofsuitwhich
reduce
theamount
recoverable
below
thestatutory
occurring
subsequent
limit
donotoust
There
areexceptions
tothis
ofcourse.
See,e.g.,28U.S.C.
rule,
jurisdiction.").
general
remand
after
a post-removal
thatdestroys
§ 1447(e)(2006)(authorizing
joinder
subject-matter
jurisdiction).
127. SeeCaterpillar
Inc.v.Lewis,
519U.S.61,73(1996)(interpreting
28 U.S.C.§ 1441as
thetime-of-removal
forremoval
whenan
rule);cf.28 U.S.C.§ 1446(b)(providing
embodying
amended
that
makes
clear
thecase"hasbecome
removable").
pleading
128. 519U.S.61(1996).
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"cured"whenthenon-diversedefendantsettledand was dismissed,leavingall
satisfied.129
diversity
requirements
defect
Althoughthejurisdictionaldefecthad been cured,the statutory
rule- remained.130
Nevertheless,
noncompliancewith the time-of-invocation
theCourtheld that,because thecase had alreadygone to trial,"considerations
of finality,efficiency,and economy" overcame the time-of-invocation
rule is
Caterpillarthusmakes clear thatthetime-of-invocation
requirement.131
that
and
to
values
could
not
apply to a
nonjurisdictional susceptible policy
In short,the time-of-invocation
rule is a triggerfor
jurisdictionaldoctrine.132
the jurisdictionaldetermination,but nonjurisdictionalconsiderationshelp
determine
whenthattriggeris pulled.
rule is not entirelydivorced from
Note that the time-of-invocation
If
the
time-of-invocation
rule applies and requires
jurisdictionalrequirements.
is
of
the
dismissal
for
lack
dismissal,
subject-matter
jurisdiction under
In
of a jurisdictionaldefect.133
Rule 12(b)(1), withall thenormalcharacteristics
otherwords,thetime-of-invocation
ruledoes triggera jurisdictionalbullet.But
the point here is that the trigger itself is subject to nonjurisdictional
considerationsand, in cases not governedby statute,purelycourtcreated.134
Thus,theproceduralrulecontrolsthejurisdictionalquestion.
2. Preconditions
eventsthatlink directlyto
Preconditionsare antecedentnonjurisdictional
Take, once again, the appellatedeadline of § 2107,
jurisdictionalquestions.135
whichrequiresthata "noticeof appeal" be "filed"withinthe timewindow.136
The statuteconditionsappellatejurisdictionon the existenceof a timelyfiled
a "notice"or a "filing"is notdefinedin thestatute
notice.But whatconstitutes
129. Id.at64,73.
130. Id.at73.
thenonjurisdictional
status
ofthetime-of-invocation
notallofits
131. M at75.Despite
rule,
SeeGrupo
Dataflux
v.AtlasGlobal
manifestations
areovercome
offactors.
Grp.,
bythiscombination
ofcitizenship
ofa
toshift
theruleforpost-invocation
L.P.,541U.S.567,574(2004)(refusing
changes
continuing
party).
490U.S.
Inc.v.Alfonzo-Larrain,
132. Other
caseshaveheldsimilarly.
SeeNewman-Green,
v. Gen.
flawinanoriginal
Grubbs
a time-of-filing
826,836-38(1989)(correcting
action);
diversity
179
a time-of-removal
Elee.Credit
405U.S.699(1972)(correcting
flaw);Baggsv. Martin,
Corp.,
341U.S.6, 16
a time-of-filing
U.S.206,209(1900)(curing
defect);
cf.Am.Fire& Cas.Co.v.Finn,
indictum).
thesameprinciple
(1951)(expressing
a brandtheCourt
istomanufacture
133. SeeGrupo
, 541U.S.at574-75("Unless
Dataflux
forlackofsubject-matter
is theonly
newexception
tothetime-of-filing
dismissal
rule,
jurisdiction
inthis
available
case.").
option
that
the"practical
rule
134. Seeid.at583(Ginsburg,
J.,dissenting)
time-of-filing
(explaining
from
orstatutory
fisnotderived!
anyconstitutional
text").
A.Hall,The
135. I introduced
thisconcept
inDodson,
supranote112,at229.SeealsoMark
ofappeal
Jurisdictional
Nature
, 21 GA.L. REV.399,410(1986)("[NJotice
oftheTimetoAppeal
. . . .").
toacquiring
a mandatory
limitations
appellate
simply
impose
precondition
jurisdiction
timing
136. 28U.S.C.§ 2107(a)(2006).
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and thusmaybe subjectto somejudicial discretionin interpretation.
Thus, for
the
word
"notice"
can
mean
an
brief
as
well
as
a formal
example,
appellate
noticeof appeal.137In addition,theterm"filed"can includea pro se prisoner's
deliveryof thepetitionto prisonofficials.138
The latterscenariowas at issue in Houstonv. Lack, a case in whicha pro
se prisonerfiled a habeas petitionthatwas denied by the districtcourt.The
prisonerdrafteda noticeof appeal and, twenty-seven
days afterthejudgment,
deliveredthenoticeto prisonofficialsforforwarding
to the court.The notice
was then filed with the court fourdays later- one day afterthe thirty-day
deadline.139
The SupremeCourtnotedthatthe statute"does notdefinewhena
noticeof appeal has been 'filed' or designatethepersonwithwhomit mustbe
filed."140
The corresponding
rules,theCourtacknowledged,do specifythatthe
noticemustbe filedwiththe clerkof the districtcourt,but theydo not state
whenthatmusthappen.141
confronting
pro
Consideringthe special difficulties
se prisonerlitigantsseeking to ensure timelyfilingof appellate papers, the
Court construed"filed" to mean, in cases of pro se prisoners,deliveryto
prisonofficials.142
Other examples abound. A "final" decision is required for federal
butwhatconstitutes
a "final"decisionmaybe subject
appellatejurisdiction,143
to some nonjurisdictional
district-court
considerations.Thus, an interlocutory
order can be deemed "final" under the judicially created "collateral order"
doctrineif, among otherthings,the issue is "too important"to be denied
immediatereview.144Also, a districtcourtcan exercise discretionto render
certainnonfinaldecisions as finalif it findsthatthereis "no just reason for

137. SeeSmith
502U.S.244,245(1992)(treating
anappellate
brief
as a "notice
of
v.Barry,
for
ofRule3 oftheFederal
RulesofAppellate
Procedure).
appeal"
purposes
138. SeeHouston
v.Lack,
487U.S.266,268(1988).
139. Id.at268.
140. Id.at272.TheCourt
wasunanimous
onthispoint.
Seeid.at278(Scalia,
J.,dissenting)
that
hasbeen'filed'
ordesignate
"thestatute
itself
doesnotdefine
when
a notice
ofappeal
(conceding
with
whom
itmust
befiled").
141. Id.at273("Thequestion
Rules3 and4] is oneoftiming,
notdestination
....
[under
the'filing'
hasoccurred.").
Rulesetsforth
criteria
fordetermining
atwhich
themoment
[N]either
142. /¿/.at
270-71.
143. 28 U.S.C.§ 1291(a)(2006).Another
rulegoverns
Court
Supreme
appellate
"finality"
nature.
overstate-court
decisions
andadmits
ofsomeexceptions
itsjurisdictional
despite
jurisdiction
of
See28U.S.C.§ 1257(a);
v.Cohn,
420U.S.469,479-83(1975).Fora discussion
CoxBroad.
Corp.
these
inthecontext
ofjurisdictional
seeScott
TheComplexity
Dodson,
of
finality
requirements
clarity,
Jurisdictional
seeAdam
N.
ofthecollateral-order
rule,
, 97VA.L.REV.1(2011).Forcriticism
Clarity
48B.C.L.REV.1237(2007).
Steinman,
Jurisdiction,
Reinventing
Appellate
144. Cohen
v.Beneficial
Indus.
LoanCorp.,
337U.S.541,546(1949)(defining
thecollateraland
order
doctrine
as "that
smallclasswhich
determine
claimsofright
from,
finally
separable
collateral
intheaction,
review
andtooindependent
ofthe
asserted
tooimportant
tobedenied
to,rights
see
causeitself
torequire
that
consideration
bedeferred
until
thewhole
caseisadjudicated");
appellate
anorder
a claimof
alsoUnited
v. Nixon,
418U.S.683,690-92(1974)(holding
States
rejecting
executive
tobeappealable).
privilege
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decision as
delay."145Finally, a districtcourt can certifyan interlocutory
if
it
finds
that
the
decision
"involves
a
appealable
controlling
questionof law as
to which there is substantialground for differenceof opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materiallyadvance the ultimate
termination
of thelitigation."146
Note that these preconditionsto jurisdictiondifferfrom procedural
preconditionsto suit. Proceduralpreconditionsto suit, such as exhaustion
are preconditions,
but theyare notjurisdictionalhybridizations
requirements,
because theydo not implicatejurisdictionaldeterminations
at all. Instead,they
are stand-aloneproceduralrules that may be raised by way of defense or,
perhapsmoreoften,by way of a motionunderRule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c).147
By contrast,preconditionsto jurisdictionare nonjurisdictional
requirements
whose satisfactions
are necessaryfortheexerciseofjurisdiction.148
A competingtake on preconditions
is thattheyare merelyinterpretations
ofjurisdictionalrequirements
and thusare themselvesjurisdictional.149
Because
appellatejurisdictionrequires a "final" decision, it could be argued that a
determination
of finalityis not a nonjurisdictional
preconditionbut ratheran
of
an
inherent
of
interpretation
component appellatejurisdiction.Jurisdictional
termsmayneedjudicial explicationjust as any otherterms,and thatexplication
does notnecessarilyhybridizethemwithnonjurisdictional
features.
In general,I agree that some interpretations
of jurisdictionaltermsare
themselvesjurisdictionaland unhybridized.The statutorydirectivethat a
is a jurisdictional
corporationis a citizen of its state of incorporation150
that
at
least
its
on
seems,
face, unsusceptible to direct
requirement
hybridization
(thougha moresubtlylinkedhybridization
mightstilloccurat the
proofstage).151

145. FED.R.CIV.P.54(b).
146. 28 U.S.C.§ 1292(b).
Onecouldinterpret
thisas a form
ofstatutory
of
incorporation
instead
of a precondition,
in that§ 1292(b)creates
an exception
to thefinality
hybridization
ofappellate
thatis grounded
injudicialdiscretion.
to David
requirement
jurisdiction
Mythanks
for
meonthis
Shapiro
prodding
point.
147. See,e.g.,ReedElsevier
Inc.v.Muchnick,
130S. Ct.1237,1241,1246(2010)(holding
theregistration
oftheCopyright
Acttobea precondition
tosuit);
Jones
v.Block,
549U.S.
requirement
exhaustion
tobe a mandatory
butnonjurisdictional
tosuit);
199,216(2007)(holding
precondition
455U.S.385,393(1982)(holding
thelimitations
forfiling
a Title
VIIlawsuit
to
Zipesv.TWA,
period
bea nonjurisdictional
tosuit).
precondition
148. See Pinion
v. DowChem.,
U.S.A.,928F.2d1522,1525n.3(11thCir.1991)("As
to ourexercise
ofjurisdiction,
ruleslikeRule4(a) are
however,
mandatory
preconditions
filing
inthesensethat,
absent
wecanacquire
nojurisdiction
ofthecauseevenif
'jurisdictional'
compliance,
itis otherwise
within
ourcompetence.");
v. Barry,
502U.S.244,248(1992)("Although
cf.Smith
courts
should
construe
whendetermining
ithasbeen
whether
[the'notice'
requirement]
liberally
isfatal
toanappeal.").
with,
complied
noncompliance
149. Mythanks
toSamJordan
forencouraging
metothink
this
through
counterproposal.
150. 28U.S.C.§ 1332(c).
151. Seeinfra
text
153-77.
notes
accompanying
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In othercircumstancesthat are more ambiguous,such as the finality
an interpretative
characterization
requirement,
maybe plausible.I do thinkthat
some requirements,
such as the"filed"requirement
of § 2107, are moreclearly
But I concede that, in many cases, both
preconditionalthan interpretive.
characterizations
are possible. My primaryaim is not so muchto definitively
resolvethecharacterization
as to demonstrate
theviabilityof hybridization
as a
and thento open thefloorfordebate.
possibility,
Having said that, however, I generally find the hybridization
characterization
moresatisfying
thantheinterpretative
characterization
fortwo
reasons. First, hybridizationnarrowsjurisdictionmore than interpretation,
which seems to retainfulljurisdictionalstatus,and, forreasons discussed in
Part IV, the narrowingof jurisdictionhas much to commendit.152Second,
and discretion
hybridization
helps resolvethetensionbetweenjurisdictionality
better than interpretation.Hybridization conceptually disaggregates the
jurisdictionalissue (whethertheappellatecourthas jurisdiction,an issue thatis
notsubjectto discretion)fromthenonjurisdictional
issue (whetherthedecision
below is "final,"which is subject to discretion)in a way thatalleviates the
tension. By contrast,interpreting
a purelyjurisdictionalrequirementin a
flexibleway exacerbatesthetension.
For those who insistthat the finalitydoctrineis still just a matterof
the taxonomydemonstrates
how a modestreorientation
of the
interpretation,
of
the
can
be
useful.
Instead
of
conceptualization
interpretative
process
of a firm
thinkingof the finalitydoctrine as a flexible interpretation
discussed
jurisdictionalphrase,the use of implied-incorporation
hybridization
above mightsuggestthatCongressimplicitlyincorporatedflexibility
intothe
of
an
thus
alternative
to the
meaning
"finality."Hybridization
provides
interpretive
theory.
C. IndirectHybridization
The subtlestformof hybridization
is whatI term"indirecthybridization."
These are jurisdictionalrules and doctrinesthatcross paths withgeneralized
rulesor doctrinesin ways thatcan allow forthemixingof the
nonjurisdictional
or timingrules.There
two,but theyare not linkedas directlyas preconditions
are at least two subspecies of indirecthybridization.
The firstencompasses
mattersof proof,and thesecondencompassesprophylactic
rules.
1. MattersofProof
Jurisdiction
itselfis "a legal conclusion,a consequenceof factsratherthan
a provable'fact.'"153In otherwords,jurisdictionflowsfromthedetermination
of certain facts. But the determinationof those facts may not itself be
152. Seeinfra
text
8.
notes
236-3
accompanying
153. Meridian
Sec.Ins.Co.v.Sadowski,
441F.3d536,541(7thCir.2006)(Easterbrook,
J.).
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our adversarialsystemdelegatesto the parties
jurisdictional.To the contrary,
and proofof facts,
theprimaryrole in theidentification,
isolation,development,
includingjurisdictionalfacts.
rulesthatattachto
Partycontroloverthesefactsand thenonjurisdictional
in
a
numberof ways. The following
them enable regulationof jurisdiction
how.
examplesillustrate
Normal diversityjurisdictionrequires that the amount in controversy
154
exceed $75,000.
There is no dispute that the amount-in-controversy
thresholdis a jurisdictionalissue- if the amount does not exceed that
thenthecourtlacks diversity
But how does thecourt
threshold,
jurisdiction.155
is met?
determine
whetherthatrequirement
The answeris thatthe courtreliesupon a series of standardsof pleading
and proofthatlead to a "formal"findingon jurisdictionthatmay be at odds
withthe"actual" existenceor nonexistenceofjurisdiction.156
The reasonis that
thelaw requiresthata decisionbe made one way or another,and theneed fora
thanthecorrectnessof thedecision.157
decisioncan be moreimportant
Further,
because thepartiesselect the factsand argumentsthatthe courtconsiders,the
courtmay reach a decision that,thoughjustifiedon what the partiespresent,
In otherwords,proceduralmechanismsgovernand
nevertheless
is incorrect.158
controlthejurisdiction-determining
process.
Several proceduresillustratehow this occurs. At the pleading stage,the
plaintiffsgood-faithallegationcontrolsunless it can be shownto a legal cerAs long as theallegation
cannotrecoverthatamount.159
taintythattheplaintiff
in
faith
then
the
is good
and unchallenged,
courthas jurisdiction.But because
jurisdictionis predicatedon the parties' pleading choices, it may have little
154. 28U.S.C.§ 1332(a).
155. See Arbaugh
v. Y & H Corp.,546 U.S. 500,514 (2006)(calling
theamount-in"aningredient
ofsubject-matter
controversy
requirement
jurisdiction").
156. Theseterms
Pardocalls"procedural
and"material
areakintowhatMichael
accuracy"
andtowhat
Robert
Summers
calls"formal
and"substantive
truth."
Michael
S.
accuracy"
legaltruth"
A Unified
andJudgment:
, 51B.C.L. REV.1451,
Pardo,
Pleadings,
Proof,
Theory
ofCivilLitigation
1470(2010);Robert
Formal
andSubstantive
Truth
inJudicial
FactS. Summers,
LegalTruth
- Their
inSome
Particular
Cases, 18Law& PHIL.
497,498(1999).
finding
Justified
Divergence
157. SeeSummers,
callsfora definite
invariably
supranote156,at505-06("Thelawalmost
fororagainst
. . . [T]he
onesidetolitigation.
lessas
decision,
judicial
proceeding
maybecharacterized
a search
forsubstantive
truth
than
asa search
for
a definite
winner.").
158. Seeid.at504("[T]he
fact-finder
ismerely
tositbackandhearevidence
presented
bythe
evidence
which
atleastinsomecaseswould
fallshort
ofthewhole
truth
that
opposing
lawyers,
might
id.at505("Among
be found
werethecourt
itself
tomakean independent
other
investigation.");
thismeans
that
somefacts
found
ornotfound,
eventhough
thesubstantive
maybeformally
things,
truth
beotherwise.
Because
offactors,
onesidemayfailtointroduce
ofanynumber
evidence
enough
toestablish
a fact,
eventhough
isavailable.").
theevidence
159. St.PaulMercury
Indem.
Co.v.RedCabCo.,303U.S.283,288-89(1938)("Therule
incasesbrought
inthefederal
dismissal
forwant
ofjurisdiction
court
isthat,
unless
thelaw
governing
thesumclaimed
controls
iftheclaimisapparently
madeingood
rule,
givesa different
bytheplaintiff
faith.
... Itmust
toa legalcertainty
that
theclaimis really
forlessthanthejurisdictional
appear
amount
tojustify
dismissal.").
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factualbasis. In fact,jurisdictionmaybe lacking,butthelaw allows theparties'
pleadings to establishit anyway.This mechanismis especially importantin
valuing equitable remedies for purposes of the amount-in-controversy
because thevaluationis so dependentuponpartyassessment.160
requirement
This pleading mechanismis not unlike the pre-1875 traditionof using
Thereare some differences,
pleadingsto establishsubject-matter
jurisdiction.161
of course.For example,underpre-1875 doctrine,thedefendantcould waive its
whereas moderndoctrinepreventsa
objectionsto jurisdictionalpleadings,162
defendantfromwaiving,consentingto, or forfeiting
jurisdictionalchallenges.
But the similarityis still strong:undereitherregime,the plaintiffspleading
assertionsor proof,establishjurisdiction.163
can, in theabsenceof contrary
If a partyor the court challenges the facts underlyingthe amount-incontroversy
allegation,thenthepartyinvokingfederaljurisdictionmustprove
those factsby a preponderanceof the evidence.164But here,too, procedural
rules regulatejurisdiction.The courtlikelywill hold a hearing,take evidence
and testimony,
findfacts,and thenmake a rulingon thejurisdictionalissue.165
In such a hearing, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply.166Those are
160. Cf.Brittain
ShawMcinnis,
The$75,000.01
: What
is theValueof
Comment,
Question
6 Geo.MASON
L. REV.1013,1018-19
that
thediversity
statute
Injunctive
(1998)(stating
Relief?,
noguidance
onhowtovalueequitable
relief
forpurposes
oftheamount-in-controversy
provides
willusually
sothat
theplaintiffs
evaluation
control).
requirement
161. Seesupra
text
notes
75-80.
accompanying
162. SeeCollins,
ofjurisdictional
theprevalence
waiver);
supranote12,at1876(recounting
seealsoDobbs,
note14,at511(recounting
thepractice
ofadmitting
facts).
supra
jurisdictional
163. Fora recent
oftheprinciple
thatsomecontestation
is required
toenable
application
441F.3d536,543
scrutinization
ofthejurisdictional
seeMeridian
Sec.Ins.Co.v. Sadowski,
facts,
ofMeridian's
wascontested,
sothe
(7thCir.2006)(Easterbrook,
J.)("None
jurisdictional
allegations
standard
ofproof
isirrelevant.").
164. See McNutt
v. Gen.Motors
Acceptance
Corp.,298 U.S. 178,189(1936)("Ifhis
inanyappropriate
ofjurisdictional
facts
arechallenged
hemust
manner,
allegations
byhisadversary
them
arenotsochallenged
that
Andwhere
thecourt
support
bycompetent
proof.
they
maystillinsist
thejurisdictional
facts
be established
orthecasebe dismissed,
andforthat
thecourt
purpose
may
demand
that
theparty
hisallegations
ofevidence.").
alleging
jurisdiction
justify
bya preponderance
inthefaceofa complaint
that
lacksan
Thisburden
canbedifficult
fordefendants
removal
justifying
forsum-certain
Actions
When
the
relief.
SeeAliceM.Noble-Allgire,
Removal
allegation
ofDiversity
inControversy
s Complaint:
TheNeed
Amount
Cannot
BeDetermined
theFaceofPlaintiff
from
for
Judicial
andStatutory
toPreserve
Courts
, 62 Mo.L.
Reform
Defendant's
EqualAccesstoFederal
REV.681,683-85(1997)(explaining
anddiscussing
those
seeKevin
Fora different
view,
difficulties).
M. Clermont,
Jurisdictional
Fact, 91 CORNELL
L. REV.973,1008-09(2006)(arguing
thatwhen
facts
totheamount-in-controversy
with
themerits,
a
determination
jurisdictional
merely
going
overlap
facie
standard
toestablish
thejurisdictional
prima
facts).
applies
165. SeeJerome
B. Grubhart,
Inc.v.Great
LakesDredge
& DockCo.,513U.S.527,537-38
a party
toestablish
attheoutset
ofa
ofa casebymeans
(1995)("Normal
practice
permits
jurisdiction
nonfrivolous
assertion
ofjurisdictional
andanylitigation
ofa contested
elements,
subject-matter
fact
issueoccurs
incomparatively
ajudgealone.").
before
jurisdictional
summary
procedure
166. SeeFED.R.Evid.101(applying
infederal
Fed.R.
theRulesto"proceedings"
courts);
Evid.1101(d)
Meridian
forexclusions
that
donotmention
determinations);
(providing
jurisdictional
that
theproof
must
befounded
, 441F.3dat541(asserting
Security
evidence");
upon"admissible
cf.
Wal-Mart
Inc.v.Dukes,
131S. Ct.2541(2011)("doubt[ing]"
that
rules
do
normal
Stores,
evidentiary
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rules governingwhatevidence can and cannotbe considered
nonjurisdictional
In addition,certainwaiverrulesapplyto theproductionof
in thedetermination.
and objectionto evidenceat a courthearing.167
Finally,a burdenof proofwill
be imposedon one of theparties.These rules allow forpartymanipulationof
evidenceused to establishor refutejurisdiction.168
To illustrate,say a case is filed in Delaware federalcourton diversity
jurisdictiongrounds.The plaintiffalleges that she is a domiciliaryof New
York. She also alleges that the defendant,a corporation,is a citizen of
thereand has itsprincipalplace of business
Delaware because it is incorporated
there.169
The SupremeCourthas held thata corporation'sprincipalplace of
business ordinarilyis where the company's "main headquarters"is.170This
defendant,however,has two separateheadquartersoffices,one in Delaware
and one in New York. Neitherparty,though,raises the possibilitythatthe
defendantis a citizenof New York because bothpartiespreferto litigatein a
federalforum.171
Nevertheless,on a motion for summaryjudgment, it comes to the
attentionof the judge that the defendantmay be non-diversebecause its
principal place of business is actually located in New York ratherthan
Delaware. Accordingly,the judge holds a hearing on the defendant's
whether,at thetimeof filing,thedefendant'sprincipal
citizenshipto determine
York or Delaware.
was
New
of
business
place
In thathearing,thepartiescannotstipulatejurisdiction,buthow fardown
the fact ladder does the jurisdictionalbar to stipulationgo? Can the parties
insteadstipulateto certainfactsthatwould tendto show thatthe defendant's
principalplace of business is Delaware? If a fact supportingthat result is
objectionablehearsay,butno one objectsto it as such,mustthecourtaccept it?
thatresultis hearsay and both parties object on that
If a fact undermining
ground,mustthecourtexclude it?172Can thepartiesuse admissionsmade in a
If the
responseto a requestforadmissionsto bind the court's factfinding?173
intheanalogous
ofclasscertification).
notapply
scenario
ifnot
that
arewaived
167. See,e.g.,Fed.R.EviD.103(requiring
contemporaneous
objections
incertain
asevidence
tocompromise
id.408(excluding
offers
circumstances).
made);
andmechanisms
168. To go evenonestepdeeper,
discovery
procedures
nonjurisdictional
Fora comprehensive
foruseintheproof
accesstojurisdictional
control
discovery
stages.
parties'
inUnited
Federal
States
seeS.I.Strong,
Jurisdictional
ofjurisdictional
Discovery
discovery,
analysis
Courts
,67Wash.& LeeL.Rev.489(2010).
for
forcorporate
169. See28 U.S.C.§ 1332(c)(2006)(establishing
citizenship
requirements
diversity
purposes).
130S. Ct.1181,1193(2010).
170. Hertz
Com.v.Friend,
thedefendant's
that
theparty's
171. Itis worth
principal
placeof
pleadings
alleging
noting
of corporate
becausethequestion
couldeasilypasstheRule11(b)testof goodfaith
business
to
be a "hardcase[]"thatmaybe susceptible
Courtconceded,
can,as theSupreme
citizenship
Id.at1194.
reasonable,
though
contradictory,
applications.
be"competent").
that
must
172. Potentially
jurisdictional
proof
yes.Seeid.at1195(stating
441F.3d536,541(7thCir.
Sec.Ins.Co. v. Sadowski,
173. Potentially
yes.See Meridian
oradmissions
"contentions
a defendant
that
canprove
interrogatories
2006)(stating
jurisdiction
using
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judge also wantsto keep the case, can thejudge dischargeher dutyby asking
the defendant'sCEO where the company's main controloccurs, and, upon
receivingthe answerof "Delaware," findjurisdictionin the face of no other
evidenceor testimony?174
proffered
These questionsare designedto elicita point:whetherjurisdictionexists
is a complicated inquiry that is obscured by the application of various
proceduralrules, party actions, and court decisions that occur withinthe
confinesof theproofmechanismof theadversarysystem.Theyare notfanciful
questions.As a real-worldexample,some courtshave held thatRule 408(a) of
theFederalRules of Evidenceprohibitstheuse of settlement
materialsto prove
or contestthe amountin controversyfor purposes of determining
diversity
if
even
those
the
issue
materials
resolve
more
jurisdiction,
jurisdictional
might
that
would allow
accurately.175Further, nonjurisdictionalprocedures
based on partyconductandjudicial discretionare
jurisdictionto be determined
and Congress rarelyprescribesa method for establishing
constitutional,176
jurisdiction,
leavingsuchproceduresto thediscretionof thejudiciary.177
The pointof all thisis thatthepracticalrealitiesof our adversarialsystem
apply to, and thereforeexert some controlover,jurisdictionalproof.Those
nonjurisdictionalmechanisms, therefore,indirectly hybridize with the
jurisdictionalquestionstheygovernin a way thatallows the nonjurisdictional
featuresto controltheunderlying
jurisdictionaldetermination.
2. ProphylacticRules
A second formof indirecthybridization
is theuse of prophylactic
rulesto
resolvejurisdictionalquestions.Prophylacticrules set boundariesapart from
the line at issue. Typical prophylacticrules include clear-statement
rules and
rules
are
created
and
based
on a
presumptions.178
Prophylactic
judicially
instate
court").
174. Potentially
for
notnecessarily
reasons.
SeeHertz
no,though
, 130S. Ct.at
jurisdictional
1195("[W]ereject
that
themere
suchas,forexample,
theonemadebypetitioner
of
suggestions
filing
a form
liketheSecurities
andExchange
Form10-Klisting
a corporation's
Commission's
'principal
offices'
a corporation's
'nerve
executive
morebe sufficient
would,without
proofto establish
center.'").
175. See,e.g.,McDevitt
v.Guenther,
522F. Supp.2d 1272,1284-86
(D. Haw.2007).Other
courts
haveallowed
theevidence,
butprimarily
under
a recognized
totheRuleas opposed
exception
atall.See,e.g.,McPhail
v.Deere
toongrounds
that
theRuledoesnotapply
tojurisdictional
hearings
& Co.,529F.3d947,956(10th
Cir.2008).
176. Collins,
outthat
doesnotprescribe
the
theConstitution
supranote12,at1883(pointing
forestablishing
andthatthehistorical
ofallowing
procedures
jurisdiction,
practice
jurisdiction
by
that
consent
suchprocedures
areconstitutional);
Dobbs,supranote14,at506("Certainly
suggests
unconstitutional
there
isnothing
about
jurisdiction
byestoppel.").
177. SeeWetmore
v.Rymer,
169U.S.115,120-21
thelackofcongressionally
(1898)(noting
andstating
that
suchanabsence
reflected
anintention
todelegate
theadoption
prescribed
procedures
ofsuchprocedures
tothecourts).
P.Frickey,
178. Fora seminal
treatment
seeWilliam
N.Eskridge,
Jr.
& Philip
ofthese
topics,
Law:ClearStatement
Rulesas Constitutional
L. REV.
, 45 VAND.
Quasi-Constitutional
Lawmaking
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considerationof judicial discretionand competingpolicies.179Much like rules
of proof,prophylactic
rulesregulatejurisdictionindirectly.
Take, for example, the presumptionthat a statutorycondition is
nonjurisdictionalunless Congress expressly ranks it as jurisdictional.180
limitcould be jurisdictionalwithoutexpressindication
Conceivably,a statutory
thatit shouldbe treatedas such.181Yet the presumption(if not overriddenby
otherfactors)would requirefederalcourtsto exercisejurisdictionanywayuntil
Congressamendedthe statutewithclearerlanguage. Anotherexample is the
presumption,created in Michigan v. Long, that a state-courtdecision on a
federalclaim is based on federallaw unlessthestatecourtclearlystatesthatits
decisionis based on an independent
and adequate stateground.182
Such presumptions
are nonjurisdictional
in nature.They are creaturesof
the judiciary.And it is up to the courts' discretionwhen and how theyare
to
employed.Thus, the SupremeCourthas imposedthe statutory
presumption
can produce.183
And it
guardagainstthewasteof resourcesthatjurisdictionality
to ease its own burden when
imposed the Michigan v.. Long
presumption
ig4
.
state-court
interpreting
opinions.
593(1992)(cataloguing
variants
ofclear-statement
rules
andthelevels
ofclarity
foreach).
required
179. SeeJohn
F. Manning,
ClearStatement
RulesandtheConstitution
L. REV.
, 110COLUM.
399(2010)(arguing
that
areinappropriate
clear-statement
rules
asconstitutional
prophylaxes).
180. SeeReedElsevier
v. Muchnick,
whether
Inc.,130S. Ct.1237,1245(2010)(analyzing
theCopyright
Act'sregistration
states"
that
itisjurisdictional);
v.Y &
requirement
"clearly
Arbaugh
H Corp.,
546U.S.500,515-16(2006)("IftheLegislature
states
that
a threshold
limitation
ona
clearly
statute's
asjurisdictional,
then
courts
andlitigants
willbedulyinstructed
andwillnot
scopeshallcount
beleft
towrestle
with
Butwhen
theissue.
doesnotrank
a statutory
limitation
oncoverage
as
Congress
courts
should
treat
therestriction
as nonjurisdictional
incharacter.")
jurisdictional,
(citation
omitted).
Thesearestatutory-coverage
Fora discussion
oftheArbaugh
clear-statement
ruleina
examples.
seeDodson,
ofpresumptions
andclearcontext,
procedural
supranote20,at66-71.Other
examples
in thejurisdiction-stripping
statement
rulesabound,
context.
v.
See, e.g.,Hamdan
particularly
548U.S.557(2006)(imposing
a clear-statement
ruleforlegislation
tostrip
Rumsfeld,
purporting
review
overexecutive-detention
Calcano-Martinez
v. INS,533U.S. 348,351
judicial
decisions);
toreadstatute
as stripping
habeas
absent
clearstatement).
For
(2001)(refusing
original
jurisdiction
see James
E. Pfander,
and theSupreme
Court'sPowerto
commentary,
Jurisdiction-Stripping
Tribunals
alternative
review
, 78TEX.L. REV.1433,1498-500
Supervise
Inferior
(2000)(discussing
CassR. Sunstein,
ClearStatement
andNational
and
Hamdan
mechanisms);
Principles
Security:
theuseofclear-statement
rules
for
,2006SUP.Ст.REV.1,46(supporting
Beyond
jurisdiction
stripping
indetention
cases).
181. See,e.g.,Bowles
v.Russell,
551U.S.205,209-11(2007)(holding
theappellate
deadline
to filea civilnoticeof appealto be jurisdictional
thelackof express
indication
of
despite
jurisdictionality).
182. See Michigan
v. Long,463 U.S. 1032,1040-41(1983)(presuming,
absent
a clear
that
thestate-court
decision
rests
andadequate
state
andthat
statement,
uponanindependent
ground,
thestate
court
decided
theissueaccording
tofederal
thedecision
to
law,thereby
rendering
appealable
theU.S.Supreme
Theindependent
andadequate
state-law
isa component
ofappellate
Court).
ground
SeeSochor
504U.S.527,534п.*(1992).
v.Florida,
jurisdiction.
183. SeeArbaugh
a clear-statement
rulebecause
ofthethreat
of
, 546U.S.at515(adopting
"unfairness"
and"waste
ofjudicial
resources").
184. SeeLong
andjudicial
administration
willbe
, 463U.S.at1041("Inthisway,both
justice
greatly
improved.").
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The nonjurisdictional
statureof clear-statement
rules and presumptions
is
even clearer when one recognizes that the Courtjust as easily could have
- againstjurisdiction.Under
in theinversedirection
craftedthesepresumptions
that inverse presumption,a statutorylimit would be jurisdictionalunless
decisionwould be deemed
Congressclearlystatedotherwise,and a state-court
to have been decided on state-lawgroundsunless the statecourtclearlystated
otherwise.185
Those inversepresumptions,
by theway, could be justifiedon the
groundsthatfederalcourtsoughtnotoversteptheirjurisdictionalmandatesand
that,as a result,the more legitimizingcourse would be to declinejurisdiction
absenta clearbasis forexercisingit.186
Whichdirectionis mostproperis notmyconcernhere.Rather,I meanto
betweenthejurisdictionalauthorization
to hear a case
highlightthedistinction
and theproceduralpowerto controlthatauthorization.
and clearPresumptions
statementrules are proceduralmechanisms,developed and set by judicial
discretion,that create space between the existence of jurisdictionand the
exercise of jurisdiction.Withinthat space, adherenceto the proceduralrule
affectsthejurisdictionalinquiry.
III.
The Explanatory Power of the Taxonomy
The taxonomydescribed in Part II can help characterizeand explain
doctrines and rules that otherwise would not fit comfortablyinto the
dichotomy.This Partshows how thetaxonomy
jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional
can both broaden and focus the conceptualizationsof some of these
troublesomedoctrines.
A. IndirectHybridization
Sovereign immunityis the rightor privilege of the sovereignto be
immunefromprivatesuits withoutits consent.187
Althoughthereare various
is
as
a
limitationon federal-court
characterize
the
one
to
doctrine,188
way
ways
After
the
textual
manifestation
of state sovereign
all,
primary
jurisdiction.
is theEleventhAmendment,
whichspeaks of limitingthe"[j]udicial
immunity
power of the United States."189The Court has sent mixed signals in its
but at least some of thosesignals
characterization
of statesovereignimmunity,
185. Indeed,
before
v. Long,theCourtsometimes
applied
justthisinverse
Michigan
Seeid.at1038-39
practice).
presumption.
(explaining
prior
andclear-statement
186. Fora discussion
ofthe"direction"
orjurisdictional
presumptions
at143,at37-40.
seeDodson,
rules,
supra
seeCLYDEE.
187. Foran excellent
andextended
treatment
ofstatesovereign
immunity,
andSovereign
Immunity
TheEleventhAmendment
Jacobs,
(1972).
seeDodson,
that
itseliis nonjurisdictional,
188. Foranargument
supra
immunity
sovereign
but
thatstatesovereign
is mandatory
note7, at 19-28(providing
theargument
immunity
nonjurisdictional).
189. U.S.CONST,
amend.
XI.
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And manycommentators
have consideredthe
have cast it as jurisdictional.190
to
be
immunity
jurisdictional.191
its
can
Despite
potentially
jurisdictionalstatus,statesovereignimmunity
be waived.192Also, it is subjectto a judiciallycreatedexceptionforprospective
reliefagainsta stateofficer.193
Finally,statesovereign
injunctiveor declaratory
need notbe raisedand policed sua sponteby a federalcourt.194
immunity
is to say that
One way to reconcilethesefeaturesof sovereignimmunity
the doctrineis notjurisdictional.That characterization,
whichI have explored
elsewhere,195has some appeal because it reflects the modern idea of
jurisdictionas separate,unique,and unalloyed.But it createstensionwiththe
textof theEleventhAmendment
and withcourtprecedent.196
As the taxonomyshows, the availabilityof jurisdictionalhybridization
opens up otheroptions.Perhaps sovereignimmunitycould be jurisdictional
features,such as waivability.One view would
despitehavingnonjurisdictional
v.Texas,131S. Ct.1651,1657-58
190. Compare
Sossamon
now,
(2011)("Forovera century
thisCourt
hasconsistently
madeclearthat
federal
oversuits
States
jurisdiction
against
unconsenting
wasnotcontemplated
when
thejudicial
oftheUnited
States.")
bytheConstitution
establishing
power
marks
andMonaco
v.Mississippi,
292U.S.313,320(1934)(stating
that
(internal
omitted),
quotation
state
isa restriction
onjurisdiction),
with
Edelman
v.Jordan,
415U.S.651,677sovereign
immunity
78(1974)(stating
that
state
ofthenature
ofa jurisdictional
immunity
partakes
sovereign
"sufficiently
andIdahov.Coeur
Tribe
521U.S.261,267(1997)(calling
d'Alene
ofIdaho,
it"a sovereign
bar"),
from
than
a nonwaivable
limit
rather
ontheJudiciary's
suit,
immunity
subject-matter
cf
jurisdiction");
United
States
v. U.S.Fid.& Guar.Co.,309U.S.506,513-15(1940)(holding
a judgment
entered
theUnited
tobevoidforlackofjurisdiction
States
without
itsconsent
under
federal
against
sovereign
immunity).
191. See,e.g.,Bradford
C. Clark,
TheEleventh
Amendment
andtheNature
, 123
oftheUnion
HARV.
L. Rev.1817,1833(2010)("Similarly,
theAmendment
is framed
as a restriction
on'[t]he
Judicial
limits
all forms
ofjurisdiction
power'andtherefore
III.").Foran
recognized
byArticle
that
somefacets
ofstate
arecomponents
ofpersonal
see
argument
sovereign
immunity
jurisdiction,
as a Doctrine
CalebNelson,
Jurisdiction
L. REV.1559
, 115HARV.
Immunity
Sovereign
ofPersonal
Eleventh
Amendment
as subject-matter
andresidual
(2002)(characterizing
immunity
jurisdiction
Fora characterization
aspersonal
offederal
asa
sovereign
immunity
jurisdiction).
sovereign
immunity
seeHydrogen
Tech.Corp.
v.United
831F.2d1155,1162n.6(1stCir.
defense,"
States,
"jurisdictional
1987).
192. SeeClark
v.Barnard,
108U.S.436,447(1883)("Theimmunity
from
suitbelonging
toa
State
... isa personal
which
itmaywaiveatpleasure ");seealsoSossamon
, 131S. Ct.at
privilege
1658("AState,
towaiveitsimmunity
infederal
court
atitspleasure.");
however,
maychoose
Lapides
v. Bd.ofRegents
oftheUniv.ofGa.,535U.S.613,620(2002)(holding
thata state's
voluntary
removal
tofederal
court
waives
Eleventh
Amendment
immunity).
193. See ExparteYoung,
209U.S. 123,159-60(1908)(allowing
sucha suit);see also
1(exploring
note70,at1210-1
thejurisdictional
basisoftheYoung
Some
Fitzgerald,
supra
exception).
theorize
as a component
than
anexception
ofimmunity
rather
toit,butthat
isnotthewaythe
Young
current
Court
viewsit.Compare
LouisL. Jaffe,
Suits
andOfficers:
Governments
Against
Sovereign
with
L.REV.1,28(1963),
Va.Office
forProt.
& Advocacy
v.Stewart,
131S. Ct.
, 77HARV.
Immunity
theYoung
doctrine
an"exception"
tostate
1632,1642(2011)(calling
sovereign
immunity).
v. Schacht,
524U.S.381,394(1988)(Kennedy,
194. SeeWis.Dep'tofCorr.
J.,concurring)
that
"courts
neednotraisetheissuesuasponte
"); Dodson,
supranote7,at28-29(explaining
(stating
state
neednotbepoliced
suasponte).
why
sovereign
immunity
195. SeeDodson,
note7,at19-28.
supra
196. Seesupra
note190.
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be to categorizesovereignimmunityas an inherentincorporation
doctrine
muchlike personaljurisdiction.Underthisformulation,
is
sovereignimmunity
but
the
of
its
stature
has
been
broadened
to
jurisdictional,
concept
jurisdictional
include nonjurisdictional
featuresattendantto it. Sovereign immunity,
then,
- a
with
could
be
considered
a
true
personal jurisdiction,197
along
hybrid
features.Althoughthatmay seem
jurisdictionaldoctrinewithnonjurisdictional
strange,thetaxonomysuggeststhatthereis a place forsucha creature.
Anotherway to characterizesovereignimmunityunder the taxonomy
- the
would be as a jurisdictionaldoctrine that contains a precondition
precondition
beinga properinvocationof immunity
by thestateentity.In other
is not reachedunless the statehas
words,the questionof sovereignimmunity
properly invoked it. Proper invocation, however, could be subject to
considerationssuch as waiveror consent.A state's failureto
nonjurisdictional
thuswould resultin thejurisdictionalquestionnever
properlyinvokeimmunity
reached.
being
The point is not to resolve the characterizationof state sovereign
immunitydefinitivelybut rather to use the taxonomy to explore its
- and theircapacities to reconcile the tensions
characterization
possibilities
- in greaterdepth.I am now on the recordas proposing
withinthe doctrine
and so no doubt
threedifferent
ways to characterizestatesovereignimmunity,
otherswill chastiseme forfailingto come to some resolutionon it. But getting
to a resolutionmyselfhas neverbeen my goal. I mean onlyto offernew ways
of conceptualizingthis difficultdoctrineso thatthose who must settleon a
characterization
have a varietyof conceptualframeworks
to aid in doingso.
B. Mootness
The SupremeCourt has linked the doctrineof standingto ArticleIll's
requirementin a way that characterizesstandingas
case-and-controversy
jurisdictional.198
Althoughthe Courthas been less clear about the doctrineof
the
mootness,199 prevailingview is thatmootnessalso is linkedto ArticleIll's
thetwo,at leastoutside
thecontext
textofthe
197. Theparallels
between
oftheliteral
Eleventh
are striking.
See Schacht
J.,concurring)
Amendment,
, 524 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy,
topersonal
that
"theimmunity
bearssubstantial
requirements");
(recognizing
similarity
jurisdiction
that
isa doctrine
note191(arguing
non-Eleventh
Amendment
state
Nelson,
supra
sovereign
immunity
ofpersonal
jurisdiction).
198. See,e.g.,ElkGrove
Unified
Sch.Dist.v. Newdow,
542U.S. 1, 11(2004).Notethat
ofthedoctrine,
Ill's requirements,
stillbe
evenifnotpartofArticle
prudential
components
might
asjurisdictional.
Seeid.at 11-12(calling
them
limits
onthe
characterized
"judicially
self-imposed
exercise
of federal
textaccompanying
notes214-228
(citation
omitted));
jurisdiction"
cf.infra
a similar
Forthedefinitive
ofthestanding,
forabstention
doctrines).
(making
argument
exposition
andripeness
seeFallonet al., supra
note101,at100-22.
doctrines,
mootness,
thatripeness
of
199. TheCourt
hasbeensomewhat
clearer
is a jurisdictional
component
442
v. United
FarmWorkers
Nat'lUnion,
Article
Ill'sbanonadvisory
See,e.g.,Babbitt
opinions.
U.S.289,297(1979);DukePower
Co.v.Carolina
Envtl.
438U.S.59,82(1978).But
Study
Group,
seeMeridian
Sec.Ins.Co.v.Sadowski,
441F.3d536,538(7thCir.2006)(claiming
that
is
ripeness
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jurisdictionalrequirements.In the 1964 case Liner v. Jafco,Inc., the Court
stated, "Our lack of jurisdictionto review moot cases derives from the
requirementof ArticleIII of the Constitutionunder which the exercise of
judicial powerdependsupon theexistenceof a case or controversy."200
Though
in
sentiment
has
been
followed
both
the
the
Court
and
dictum,
largely
Supreme
thelowercourts.201
The difficulty
witha jurisdictionalcharacterization
is thatthe Courtalso
has recognizedthreeprudentialexceptionsto thedoctrinethatare neitherfound
in ArticleIII nor even related to the values underlyingthe doctrine:the
"capable of repetitionyet evading review,""voluntarycessation,"and classaction exceptions.202
The very existence of these exceptionsclashes with a
but
simple
powerfulsyllogism:jurisdictionaldoctrinesadmitto no judicially
created exceptions. Mootness is a jurisdictional doctrine. Therefore,no
203
exceptionsshouldbe allowed.
The tension between the jurisdictional stature of mootness and its
to criticizethe doctrine
judiciallycreatedexceptionshas caused commentators
as "lack[ing] a coherenttheoreticalfoundation"204
and "incomprehensible."205
Even SupremeCourtJusticeshave leveled criticismon thisbasis.206The result
is that the Court has settled,as it has with sovereign immunity,into an

nota limit
onsubject-matter
GeneR.Nichol,
andtheConstitution
, 54U.
Jr.,
jurisdiction);
Ripeness
CHI.L.Rev.153,167(1987)(arguing
ajurisdictional
characterization).
normatively
against
200. 375U.S.301,306n.3(1964).
201. SeeHonig
v.Doe,484U.S.305,317-18 & n.5(1988)(considering
a mootness
argument
notraised
andforthefirst
timeonappeal);Spencer
v. Kemna,
523U.S. 1,7 (1998)
byanyparty
allstages
subsists
offederal
....
("Thiscase-or-controversy
requirement
through
judicial
proceedings
Theparties
must
continue
tohavea 'personal
stake
intheoutcome'
ofthelawsuit.")
(citation
omitted);
Matthew
I. Hall,ThePartially
Prudential
Doctrine
L. REV.562,573&
, 77GEO.WASH.
ofMootness
n.49(2009)(detailing
EvanTsenLee,Deconstitutionalizing
theprecedent);
The
Justiciability:
L. Rev.603,612(1992)(explaining
that
theLinerdictum
"was
, 105HARV.
Example
ofMootness
insubsequent
Court
broadly
accepted
Supreme
opinions").
202. Hall,supranote201,at576-77.
hasroutinely
TheSupreme
Court
characterized
these
as
ithasbeenclearer
tomootness,
aboutthecharacterization
ofthe"capable
of
"exceptions"
though
butevading
review"
thanaboutthe"voluntary
cessation"
andclassactions
repetition
exception
States
v.Juvenile
the
See,e.g.,United
Male,131S. Ct.2860,2865(2011)(reaffirming
exceptions.
characterization
ofthe"capable
ofrepetition
butevading
review"
doctrine
asan"established
exception
tomootness");
oftheEarth,
Friends
Inc.v.Laidlaw
Envtl.
Servs.
(TOC),Inc.,528U.S.167,189-93
tomootness").
"thelong-recognized
Fora thorough
review
ofthese
(2000)(discussing
exceptions
ETAL.,
seeFALLON
note101,at189-91.
exceptions,
supra
203. Erwin
A Unified
toJusticiability
L. REV.677,692
, 22 CONN.
Chemerinsky,
Approach
is anarticle
III requirement,
thenhowcantheCourt
create
broadexceptions
(1990)("Ifmootness
basedonthedesire
tofacilitate
review
. . . ?"); Hall,supranote201,at562-64,584-85
judicial
thesamepoint).
(making
204. Hall,supra
note
201,at562.
205. Robert
J. Pushaw,
and Separation
Jr.,Justiciability
of Powers:A Neo-Federalist
L.REV.393,490(1996).
, 81CORNELL
Approach
206. Honig
v.Geraghty,
U.S.Parole
Comm'n
, 484U.S.at330(Rehnquist,
C.J.,
concurring);
445U.S.388,411(1980)(Powell,
is oneofpower,
thepractical
J.,dissenting)
("Sincethequestion
ofreview
cannot
control.").
importance
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that
unsatisfyingcharacterizationof mootness as a "flexible" doctrine207
"derivesfrom"theArticleIII case-and-controversy
requirement.208
Others have tried to reconcile the jurisdictionalityof the mootness
themootnessdoctrine(or parts
doctrinewithits exceptionsby recharacterizing
of
of it) as nonjurisdictional.209
My theory hybridization
suggestsanotherway,
whichbeginsby challengingthe syllogism'smajor premisethatjurisdictional
doctrinesadmitto no judiciallycreatedexceptions.If I am right,thenmootness
and its exceptionscould be reconciledthroughhybridization,
resultingin a
uniform
and morecoherentdoctrine.
For example, one could conceive of mootness and its prudential
Mootnessis a jurisdictional
exceptionsas a formof incorporated
hybridization.
but it expresslyincorporatesinto its contourssome prudential
requirement,
considerations,includingthe exceptionsdeveloped by the Court. Under this
theexceptionsdo notallow thecourtto heara mootcase but
conceptualization,
ratherare part of the definitionof mootnessitself.The voluntary-cessation
if conductis voluntarily
of thishybridization:
principleis a primeillustration
Such an
ceased, the case is simply not moot as a definitionalmatter.210
of
that
the
flexible
characterization
much-maligned
explanation suggests
mootness may be exactly right if only the conceptualization of
in itscontours.
is broadenedto includesuch flexibility
jurisdictionality
Or perhaps the jurisdictionallimit underlyingmootness is controlled
timing-wiseby a trigger,a considerationthat parallels Henry Monaghan's
famous assertionthat mootness is "the doctrineof standingset in a time
is theinverseof the
frame."211
The timingrulefortheArticleIII determination
the
the
time-of-invocation
determination.
Unlike
rule,212
statutory-jurisdiction
usual ArticleIII ruleis thatstandingmustexistat all stagesof review"and not
But if- like thetime-of-invocation
simplyat thedate theactionis initiated."213
- the timing rule for justiciability is
rule for statutoryjurisdiction
then it could be shiftedor changed forprudentialreasons.
nonjurisdictional,
This would mean thatstandingwould onlyneed to existat certainpointsin the
207. Geraghty
,445U.S.at398^01.
416U.S.312,316(1974).
208. DeFunis
v.Odegaard,
209. See,e.g.,Hall,supranote201(arguing
thattheexceptions
applytothe prudential
inArticle
than
ofthemootness
doctrine
rather
thecomponent
III);Lee,supra
component
grounded
note201,at654-68(arguing
forwholesale
deinstitutionalization
ofmootness);
Pushaw,
supranote
I amsympathetic
tothese
205,at490-93(same).
arguments.
inthecases.See,e.g.,United
210. There
forthisdefinitional
characterization
issomesupport
"doesnotmake
v.W.T.Grant
that
cessation
States
Co.,345U.S.629,632(1953)(stating
voluntary
thecasemoot").
211. Henry
P. Monaghan,
Constitutional
TheWhoandWhen
, 82 YALEL.J.
Adjudication:
inFriends
that
disclaimed
ofmootness
theCourt
thisdescription
1363,1384(1973).I amaware
ofthe
Inc.v.Laidlaw
Envtl.
Servs.
Earth,
(TOC),Inc.,528U.S.167,190(2000).
124-134.
212. Seesupra
text
notes
accompanying
Co.v. Bonner
213. Roev. Wade,410U.S. 113,125(1973);seealsoU.S.Bancorp
Mortg.
MallP'ship,
513U.S.18,21(1994)("[A]casemust
exist
atallthestages
ofappellate
review.").
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litigation, and those points could be set based on nonjurisdictional
considerations.If, for example, the capable-of-repetition-but-evading-review
principleapplies, thenit would apply not as an exceptionto thejurisdictional
doctrineitselfbut ratherto the nonjurisdictional
timingrule thatArticleIII
In
a case, if the plaintiff
at
all
such
must
be
determined
stages.
requirements
had standingand the case was not moot at the timeof filing,thenArticleIII
was satisfiedat the time of invocation.As in otherjurisdictionalcontexts,
subsequentevents,such as the eliminationof the plaintiffsinterest,would
to thejurisdictionaldetermination.
become irrelevant
Again, the point is not to determinewhetheror what hybridizationis
on theavailabilityof hybridization
thepointis to focusattention
correct;rather,
tensions
of themootnessdoctrine.
for
the
internal
as a mechanism resolving
C. DiscretionaryDeclines ofJurisdiction
statuteallows a courtto declineto exercise
The supplemental-jurisdiction
claims over which it admittedlyhas supplementaljurisdictionif, in the
It also allows a courtto
discretionof thecourt,jurisdictionis notwarranted.214
retainsupplemental
jurisdictionclaims foradjudicationon themeritseven after
the dismissalof all anchorclaims thatgave rise to federaljurisdictionin the
firstplace.215For example,in a case thatpresentsbothfederaland stateclaims,
if theplaintiff
dismissesthe federalclaims,thedistrictcourtcould,
voluntarily
in its discretion,keep thestateclaims even if thepartieswere non-diverse.The
Supreme Court has held these statutoryauthorizationsto be constitutional
issues arise from
underArticleIII.216A numberof jurisdictional-hybridization
217
thesecircumstances.
The firstissue is whetherthe discretionarydecline of supplemental
, Inc. v. HIF Bio,
jurisdictionis itselfjurisdictional.In Carlsbad Technologies
fileda patentlawsuitin statecourt,allegingviolationsof state
Inc., plaintiffs
and federallaw. The defendantremovedtheentirecase to federaldistrictcourt.
thedistrictcourtdismissedtheonly federalclaim in the lawsuitfor
Thereafter,
to exercise
failureto statea claim, and it declined,pursuantto the statute,218
state-law
claims.
the
over
the
Accordingly,
remaining
supplemental
jurisdiction
district
courtremandedthestate-lawclaimsback to statecourt.
The plaintiffappealed the remandorder,arguingthatthe districtcourt
should have exercised supplementaljurisdictionover the state-law claims
because they implicated federal patent-lawrights. The court of appeals
outguidance
fortheexercise
ofsuchdiscretion).
214. 28U.S.C.§ 1367(c)
(2006)(setting
215. Id.
484U.S.343,350-51(1988)(holding
216. SeeCarnegie-Mellon
Univ.v. Cohill,
pendent
claims
constitutional).
with
similar
istheSupreme
Court's
217. A related
doctrine
jurisdiction,
implications
original
SeeShapiro,
which
theCourt
hastreated
asdiscretionary.
supranote105,at561.
218. 28U.S.C.§ 1367(c)(3).

This content downloaded from 130.65.109.20 on Sat, 20 Jun 2015 17:17:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1478

CALIFORNIALAWREVIEW

[Vol. 99:1439

dismissed the appeal, findingthat the remand order could be colorably
characterizedas a remandbased on lack of subject-matter
jurisdictionand,
barredfromreviewunder§ 1447(d).219
therefore,
The SupremeCourt held thata remandorderbased on a discretionary
decline of supplementaljurisdictionwas not a remand"for lack of subjectmatterjurisdiction"underthe removalstatute.220
The Courtreasonedthatthe
discretionarydecline of supplementaljurisdiction is not a jurisdictional
221
matter. It analogized to remandsbased on abstentiondoctrines,which the
Court also had held not to be "for lack of subject-matter
In
jurisdiction."222
essence, Carlsbad viewed discretionto decline jurisdictionas a separate,
overrideof thejurisdictionalgrant.Underthe Court's view,
nonjurisdictional
exists
jurisdiction
only accordingto thegrantand itsjurisdictionalexclusions,
not according to any exercise of discretion.The discretionarydecline of
remandof a case
supplemental
jurisdictionwould thenbe a nonjurisdictional
overwhichthecourtnevertheless
has and continuesto havejurisdiction.
Carlsbad may have reachedthe rightresultin characterizing
the court's
exercise of discretionas nonjurisdictional.223
For my purposes here, I am
agnosticon thatquestion.I onlynotethatusingmytaxonomymighthave led to
the conclusionthatthe exerciseof discretionwas, in fact,jurisdictional.Two
potentialhybridizations
explainhow.
The firstpossibility is viewing discretionas incorporatedinto the
in a mannersimilarto the statutory
jurisdictionaldetermination
incorporation
of "good cause" in § 2107(c). The exerciseofjudicial discretionenablesa court
to shifttheboundariesof itsjurisdictionby using nonjurisdictional
considerabut
the
result
is
a
featureof
tions,
jurisdictionaldecision.The nonjurisdictional
judicial discretionis partand parcelof thejurisdictionalboundary,suchthatthe
219. Carlsbad
Inc.v.HIFBio,Inc.,129S. Ct.1862,1863-65
Techs.,
(2009).
220. Id.at 1864-65.
TheCourt
hadheldthat
a district
court
rather
previously
mayremand,
than
claims
that
hadbeenremoved
state
court
tofederal
from
court.
dismiss,
supplemental
jurisdiction
SeeCohill,
484U.S.at357.
221. Carlsbad
thusheldtheremand
order
, 129S. Ct.at 1867.TheCourt
appealable
despite
baronsuchreview.
Theappealability
ofremand
orders
atissueinCarlsbad
hasgenerated
§ 1447(d)'s
Fora review
ofthat
andthepowerful
that
mandamus
significant
controversy.
controversy
argument
should
beusedtoreview
thanexceptions
remand
orders
rather
to§ 1447(d),
seeJames
E. Pfander,
Collateral
Review
theSupervisory
Orders:
RoleoftheSupreme
Court
, 159U.
ofRemand
Reasserting
PA.L.Rev.493(2011).
222. SeeQuackenbush
v.Allstate
Ins.Co.,517U.S.706,711-12(1996).Abstention
doctrines
allowfederal
courts
todecline
toexercise
fora variety
ofreasons,
ofwhich
are
jurisdiction
many
within
their
discretion.
SeeShapiro,
ClassAction
Fairness
Act
supranote105,at574-88.1notethat
hasa similar
See28U.S.C.§ 1332(d)(3)
that
a
(CAFA)
jurisdiction
discretionary
provision.
(providing
district
court
intheinterests
ofjustice
andlooking
atthetotality
ofthecircumstances,
decline
to
"may,
exercise
overcertain
classactions).
jurisdiction"
223. Or,perhaps,
Carlsbad
meant
tosayonlythata discretionary
decline
ofsupplemental
under
oftheappealability
ofremand
§ 1367(c)is nonjurisdictional
jurisdiction
onlyforpurposes
orders
under
whileleaving
that
itisjurisdictional
forother
§ 1447(d)
openthepossibility
purposes,
suchasa dismissal
ina caseoriginally
infederal
filed
court.
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decision to declinejurisdictionwithdrawsjurisdiction,while the
discretionary
to exercisejurisdictionestablishesit.
decision
discretionary
Carlsbad overlooked this possibilityby assuming that the exercise of
discretion could never be jurisdictional.224But hybridization allows
jurisdictionaldoctrinesto incorporatediscretion.The exercise of discretion
may shiftthe jurisdictionalline, but it still resultsin a jurisdictionalruling.
Carlsbad at least should have entertainedthe possibilitythat supplemental
jurisdictioncould incorporatediscretioninsteadof assumingthatdiscretionis
anathematojurisdiction.
The second possible hybridizationemploys a triggershift. Carlsbad
involvednon-diverse,
privatepartieslitigatinga federalclaim and severalstate
claims at thetimeof removal.Later,thecourtdismissedtheonlyfederalclaim
and declined to retain supplementaljurisdictionover the remainingstate
claims.225Under normal operation of the time-of-invocation
trigger,the
fixed the
invocation
and
at
the
time
of
occurred
assessment
jurisdictional
beforethedismissalof thefederalclaim. Although
jurisdictionaldetermination
thedistrictcourthadjurisdictionto considertheremainingstate-lawclaims,the
considerationsof "judicial economy, convenience
supplemental-jurisdiction
and fairness to litigants" overrode that jurisdiction.226Thinking about
supplemental
jurisdictionin thisway causes theanomalyof basingjurisdiction
But because thetime-of-invocation
considerations.
these
upon
nonjurisdictional
thetimethatthe courtexercises
it
shifted
to
could
be
is
rule nonjurisdictional,
its discretionunder § 1367(c). And, conveniently,the considerationsfor
rule are quite similarto those for exercising
shiftingthe time-of-invocation
rule
If the time-of-invocation
discretionunder supplementaljurisdiction.227
would
be
shiftsto the timeof discretion,thenthejurisdictionaldetermination
made anew based on circumstances
existingin thecase at thattime whenthe
federalclaim has been dismissedand no basis forfederaljurisdictionremains.
of
rule stays withthe determination
The resultis thatthe time-of-invocation
and anyresultingdecisionon jurisdictionis itselfjurisdictional.
jurisdiction,
Preconditions
D. VariousStatutory
The taxonomyrecognizes that preconditionsto jurisdictionneed not
themselvesbe jurisdictional.This helps explain a numberof otherdoctrines.
One obvious possibilityis the need for effectiveservice of process before
itis
thedeclination
isdiscretionary,
that
because
224. Carlsbad
, 129S. Ct.at1867(reasoning
nonjurisdictional).
225. 28U.S.C.§ 1367(c).
v.Gibbs,
383U.S.715,726(1966);seealso28 U.S.C.§ 1367(c)
226. United
MineWorkers
decline
ofjurisdiction).
outbasesfordiscretionary
(setting
of"judicial
consideration
Gibbs
227. Compare
, 383 U.S. at 726 (encouraging
economy,
519U.S.61,75(1996)(shifting
Inc.v.Lewis,
with
andfairness
tolitigants"),
convenience
Caterpillar
andeconomy").
rulefor
reasons
of"finality,
thetime-of-invocation
efficiency,
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personaljurisdictionwill attach.Service could be thoughtof as a precondition
to the court's exercise of jurisdictionover a defendant,but service itselfis
Other nonjurisdictional
nonjurisdictional.228
preconditionsmightinclude the
presentationrequirementin the Social SecurityAct,229the need to obtain a
letterfromtheEqual Employment
Commissionbefore
right-to-sue
Opportunity
a
Title
VII
and
the
that
a
tax-refund
action,230
filing
requirement
applicant
Note thatthe curabilityof
timelypay his entireassessed deficiencyin full.231
does notmake it any less of a precondition;
noncompliancewitha precondition
as the taxonomy acknowledges, timing rules may also be employed as
can be thought
features,suchthatthecuringof a precondition
nonjurisdictional
of as a nonjurisdictional
timeshiftforsatisfying
theprecondition.
IV.
A Normative Picture
The previous Parts provided a theoreticalaccount of jurisdictional
and exploredanalyticallysome of its effectson currentdoctrine.
hybridization
This Partsketchesoutthenormative
pictureforjurisdictionalhybridization.
A. TheBenefitofJurisdictional
Regulation
Jurisdictionalhybridizationenables jurisdictionalregulation.Linking
withnonjurisdictionality
allows more courtand partycontrol
jurisdictionality
of jurisdictionalissues, questions,and contours.That, in turn,has several
benefits.Court controland discretionpermitgreaterconsiderationof those
- equity, discretion,efficiency,and economy- thatjurisdictionality
features
eschews. Party controlmay mitigatesome of the costs of jurisdictionby
allowingthepartiesto selectonlythoseissues thatwarrantlitigation.In short,
if equity or discretionought to be applied but for a characterizationof
jurisdictionality,
jurisdictionality
oughtto be limited.
In thatvein, reconsiderBowles, in which the Court rejecteda habeas
petitionthatwas timelyunder the lower court's timelinebut was untimely
underthe governingstatute.No one disputesthe gross unfairnessto Bowles
If not for
whenhe reliedon theerroneousdistrict-court
orderto his detriment.
the jurisdictionalcharacterization,
he would have been excused from his
noncomplianceand entitledto an appeal. The problemfor Bowles was the

id.
228. See, e.g.,FED.R. ClV.P. 12(h)(deeming
waivableobjections
to service);
service
12(a)(l)(A)(ii)
waivable).
(deeming
it as a
229. See Mathews
v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319,328-30(1976)(characterizing
jurisdictional
precondition).
230. SeePerdue
v.RoyStone
Transfer
690F.2d1091,1093(4thCir.1982)(discussing
Corp.,
theprecondition).
anaction
fora refund);
231. See28 U.S.C.§ 7422(setting
outtherequirements
forfiling
United
States
v.Baggot,
thestatute
torequire
463U.S.476,478-79(1983)(interpreting
prepayment
oftheassessment).
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characterization
of thedeadlineas jurisdictional.The dissentin Bowles argued
that that characterization
ought not control,but the taxonomyprovides an
alternativeanswer. Under a hybridizationtheory, the deadline can be
jurisdictional,but that jurisdictionalityis regulated by the equity of the
circumstances.Much as JusticeBlack would have held in Teague, the statute
could be read to implicitlyincorporateconsiderationsof equityand discretion.
The majoritymightstillbe correctthatthethirty-day
deadlineis jurisdictional,
but equityand discretionmighthelp determinewhen thatdeadline has been
met.232In otherwords,both thejurisdictionalstatureof the deadline and the
doctrinemightlive togetherin harmony.
exceptionalcircumstances
One additionalnuanceabove and beyondBowles is thatthehybridization
ofjurisdictionaldoctrineswithnonjurisdictional
rulesdoes notmean thatthose
ruleshave onlynonjurisdictional
effects.As mentionedearlier
nonjurisdictional
in this Article,nonjurisdictional
rules can have jurisdictionaleffects,233
and
theremightbe good reasons why nonjurisdictionalcontrolsof jurisdiction
shouldthemselveshave somejurisdictionaleffects.Waivability,forexample,is
a productof cateringto theadversarysystem,and theremaybe good reasonnot
to caterso muchto theadversarysystemon mattersofjurisdiction.234
Thus,for
a
rule
be
to
discretion
example, nonjurisdictional
timing
may
subject judicial
yetalso be immunefrompartywaiveror consent.The pointis notto eliminate
jurisdictionalfeaturesand effectsfromjurisdictionalrules; thepointis to free
themfromtheconfinesof thejurisdictional-nonjurisdictional
dichotomyso that
can
be
mixed
and
matched
in
a
that
best
fits
the
they
way
particularrule and
circumstances
at hand.
In thisregard,I do notmeanto suggestthatmytaxonomymanifestslevels
of preferencefor settingthat optimal hybridization.Perhaps incorporated
in one
hybridization
regulatesjurisdictionmost effectivelyand appropriately
set of circumstances,
while indirecthybridization
does so in a different
set of
circumstances.
in
out
the
is
to
show
the
My purpose setting
taxonomy merely
and that,as a whole,theyhave value.
optionsthatexistforhybridization
no
incurs
Hybridization, doubt,
countervailingcosts. A dichotomyis
to
and
understand,
simple, easy
relativelyeasy to categorizein most cases.

232. Fora similar
seePerry
onJurisdictionality,
the
Dane,Sad Time:Thoughts
argument,
andBowlesv. Russell,
102Nw.U. L. Rev.COLLOQUY
164,167-68(2008),
LegalImagination,
1/sad-time-though.html.
http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edU/main/2008/0
233. Seesupra
text
notes
46-58.
accompanying
234. SeeHall,supra
note135,at419("[I]fa procedural
ruleprotects
than
interests
those
larger
oftheimmediate
ifthere
aregreater
societal
concerns
at stake,
thenwaiver
parties,
maynotbe
Insuchcases,theimmediate
oftheerror
isnotanadequate
for
appropriate.
parties'
cognizance
proxy
thedegree
ofsocietal
harm.
Theinterests
that
areprejudiced
theharms
to
bythedefect
mayoutweigh
caused
thedefect.");
to
judicial
efficiency
bydelayinraising
cf.Kenneth
CulpDavis,AnApproach
Problems
intheAdministrative
Process
L. REV.364,379-83(1942)(making
, 55HARV.
ofEvidence
theanalogical
that
thewaivability
ofevidentiary
oradmissions
notapplyin
point
objections
ought
non-adversarial
administrative
proceedings).
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Hybridizationcomplicatesthings.But as a descriptivematter,jurisdictional
complexityexists,whetherwe like it or not.One would have to turna blindeye
to realityto adhereto thedichotomyand suffertheresultingcostsof inaccuracy
and doctrinalconfusion.And jurisdictionalcomplexity,despite its costs, has
some greatvirtues,whichI have exploredelsewhere.235
At bottom,thenormativeargumentis a complicatedone. It likelyturnson
the circumstancesand may ultimatelydepend upon empiricalassessments.I
will have greatbenefitsin some areas and perhaps
suspectthathybridization
fewer benefitsin others.More study must be done to sort the normative
questionsout,and, ratherthando thathere,I simplysketchout thenormative
pictureand leave it to futureprojectsto flesh thatpictureout in concrete
circumstances.
But thereis an important
payoffthatoughtto be embraced:theacceptance
is always
of hybridization
as an option.Withouthybridization,
jurisdictionality
I
the
It
at
in
some
of
and
is
least
also,
examples have laid
rigid,isolated,
costly.
as an option,perhapsthosecosts
out,in tensionwithitself.Withhybridization
At theveryleast,hybridization
and tensionscan be mitigatedprofitably.
gives
courts and legislatures a fuller range of options for craftingthe most
appropriaterule, with the most appropriate effects, for the particular
itgoverns.
circumstances
B. TheBenefitofJurisdictional
Solidarity
softensthe harshnessof jurisdiction,
At the same timethathybridization
reaffirms
it.As Evan Lee has forcefully
argued:
hybridization
the
term
from
our
legal lexiconis out of the
"jurisdiction"
[B]anishing
of
question.Centuries Anglo-Americanjurisprudenceare built upon
the notion that somethingcalled "jurisdiction"is a predicate for
eliminatingthe
movingforwardin adjudication.Equally importantly,
doctrines of jurisdictionwould be extremelydisruptiveto, and
ofjustice.236
inefficient
for,theadministration
thescope of
In addition,jurisdictionhas a structural
role to play in determining
whena case passes fromone
of law-speakinginstitutions,
particularly
authority
thatcertainlimitations
It performs
an expressiverole in affirming
to another.237
And ithas thepsychologicalboon of allowing,in
or fundamental.
are important
note143.
235. Seegenerally
Dodson,
supra
236. Lee,supranote19,at 1628;seealsoDane,supranote232,at 166("[A]fundamental
is
isthat
asa classical
feature
ofourlegalculture,
oftheideaofjurisdiction,
jurisdictionality
postulate
the
itreally
doesimplicate
Ifa ruleisjurisdictional,
than
more
consequences.
justa labelforcertain
ofa court.").
authority
L.KEV.14b/,
I heJurisdictional
Label:UseandMisuse
237. SeeAlexLees,Note,
, 38¡STAN.
to
institution
from
onelaw-speaking
ifa ruleoperates
1460(2006)("I argue
that
toshift
authority
makes
that
that
decision
andis premised
ona policy
another
inthecaseofcompliance,
compliance
be treated
thentherulecanjustifiably
forresolution
oflawthananother,
institution
moreproper
rigidly.").
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a judge to wash his or herhands of the issue, even if the
some circumstances,
rule leads to harsh or unjust results. In short,although it has its costs,
jurisdictionhas itsbenefitstoo.
retainsthese virtues.Hybridizationregulates
My theoryof hybridization
it reaffirms
and narrowsjurisdictionbutdoes noteviscerateit. To thecontrary,
its importance.Hybridizationis both conjoining and defining.It allows
to combinewithnonjurisdictionality,
but,at the same time,it
jurisdictionality
reinforceswhatis and is notjurisdictionalby forcingdetailedconsiderationof
of variouscomponentsof therule.
thecharacterization
To illustrate,consider sovereign immunity.Without hybridization,
- perhaps impossible- to characterize as
sovereign immunityis difficult
jurisdictionalbecause it can be waived or consentedto. These nonjurisdictional
characteristicsinhibit any attemptto classify sovereign immunityas an
unalloyedjurisdictionaldoctrine.
Hybridization,however, permits a jurisdictional characterizationof
sovereignimmunityby reconcilingthe tension.Opening the doctrineup to
featureof
exposes the waiver componentas a nonjurisdictional
hybridization
as
a
unit.By
the
doctrine
in
or
linked
to)
jurisdictional
(whetherincorporated
dissociating troublesomefeatures,calling them what they are, and then
and
rejoining them under the hybridizationtheory, nonjurisdictionality
each.
The
with
a
clearer
of
concept of
picture
jurisdictionalitycoexist,
thus
all
remain
intact.
and itsstructural
role
itsexpressivefunction,
jurisdiction,
can help reconcileapparentconflicts
Further,
my theoryof hybridization
betweenthe natureof jurisdictionand the availabilityof judicial discretion.
ProfessorFred Bloom, for example, has argued thatjurisdictionis a "lie"
because althoughitpurportsto be inflexibleand rigid,courtsregularlyexercise
view.
discretionover its boundaries.238
My theorytakes a somewhatdifferent
ofjurisdictionas special and unique maybe a
The conventionalunderstanding
lie, butrevealingthattruthshouldhelp assuage Bloom's concerns.
The timing rules of Caterpillar, which allow nonjurisdictional
considerationsto shiftthe determinationof jurisdictionfrom the time of
Bloom argues
invocationto thetimeof finaljudgment,providean illustration.
that Caterpillar used considerationsof efficiencyand economy to adjust
rule were
That would be trueif thetime-of-invocation
diversity
jurisdiction.239
rule is linked to
itselfjurisdictional.But it is not. The time-of-invocation
Thus,theefficiency
subject-matter
jurisdiction,butit is itselfnonjurisdictional.
and economy concerns in Caterpillar applied only to overcome a
nonjurisdictionaldefect, somethingpermissibleeven under the traditional
ofjurisdiction.
conceptualization
238. Bloom,
note105,at1004.
supra
- arenotpart
- likeweight
ofdiversity's
andexpedience
239. Id.("Butcostandconvenience
calculation.").
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Conclusion
Jurisdiction
needs a new vision. It is not so separateand unique as its
recenthistorysupposes.And it is notas binaryas manyseem to think.Perhaps
- witha bundleof consequences.240
Whateverits
jurisdictionis akinto property
a
that
is
is
doctrine
to
various
considerations
meta-theory,
jurisdiction
subject
that are not capturedby a dichotomy.Indeed, it can be hybridizedwith
featuresand considerations
in a hostof different
nonjurisdictional
ways.
has
benefits.
It
offers
new
of
Hybridization
ways conceptualizingdifficult
doctrines. Sovereign immunity,mootness, and discretionarydeclines of
jurisdictionall illustratethe struggleto use a rigid dichotomyto capture
nuance. Hybridizationprovidesa way out thatallows formore sensible and
usefulconceptualizations.
also enables regulationofjurisdiction
Hybridization
in ways thatcan be beneficialto partiesand to thejudicial systemas a wholeby
then,can be harnessedboth
limitingthehighcosts ofjurisdiction.Jurisdiction,
to minimizeitscostsand maximizeitsadvantages.
Partof thechallengein re-envisioning
will be to createa
jurisdictionality
new lexicon to describe hybridization'seffects. Because the modern
and nonjurisdictionality
are antipodally
conceptualizationsof jurisdictionality
defined,hybridization
requiresa new terminologyto communicateblended
rules. "Nonjurisdictional"
no longermeans havinga definedset of functional
effects. Likewise, something "jurisdictional" that is hybridized with
featuresloses some of itsdefinitional
nonjurisdictional
power.
I am not convincedthatthe termsare worthless,however. They may
but thatdoes not mean thatsuch
operateat a morediffuselevel of specificity,
labels shouldbe discarded.As arguedin PartIV, the term"jurisdiction"may
stillhave powerfulstructural,
expressive,and psychologicalroles to play even
whendivorcedfroma set of functionaleffects.Whatare needed,however,are
additionallabels forthespecifichybridsat hand. I have namedsome here,but
thereare countlessothersto explore.I suspect(and hope) thatthosemonikers
will come as theuse of thehybridsbecomesmoreaccepted.

240. I owethis
rumination
toProfessor
EvanTsenLee.
insightful
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